

NIE 85/80/90-81

Cuban Policy Toward Latin America

Volumes I and II


23 June 1981 and 24 July 1981

This page is intentionally left blank.



Director of
Central
Intelligence

~~SECRET~~



addenda

NFB

NIE 85/80/90-81

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: FEB 2008

Cuban Policy Toward Latin America

(b) (3)

National Intelligence Estimate

~~Secret~~

NIE 85/80/90-81
23 June 1981


Copy 178

Warning Notice
Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved
(WNINTEL)

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions

DISSEMINATION CONTROL ABBREVIATIONS

NOFORN- Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals
NOCONTRACT- Not Releasable to Contractors or
Contractor/Consultants
PROPIN- Caution—Proprietary Information Involved
NFIBONLY- NFIB Departments Only
ORCON- Dissemination and Extraction of Information
Controlled by Originator
REL . . .- This Information Has Been Authorized for
Release to . . .
FGI- Foreign Government Information



~~SECRET~~

**THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE.**

**THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS,
EXCEPT AS NOTED IN THE TEXT.**

***The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the
Estimate:***

**The Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security
Agency, and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Treasury, and
Energy.**

Also Participating:

**The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, Marine Corps**

~~SECRET~~

This page is intentionally left blank.

~~SECRET~~

NIE 85/80/90-81

CUBAN POLICY TOWARD
LATIN AMERICA

Information as of 23 June 1981 was
used in the preparation of this Estimate.

~~SECRET~~

This page is intentionally left blank.

~~SECRET~~

THE ESTIMATE

Two years ago, Cuba reverted to much more militant support of revolutionary insurgents, especially in Central America. Castro sees promising opportunities through the promotion of insurgency to advance the cause of revolution in the region, restore a sense of revolutionary momentum at home, and enhance Cuba's security—by helping sympathetic regimes come to power in the area and by pursuing policies to justify and possibly increase Soviet aid and support for Cuba. Serious domestic economic and political problems and other adversities have made Castro more rather than less militant on behalf of regional insurgents, a reflection of his frustrations over these problems and of the increased influence of his hardline advisers. Despite Castro's signals of an interest in reducing bilateral tensions with the United States (par for the course with new US administrations), he almost certainly will not make any significant foreign policy concessions to improve relations. Under most circumstances—certainly much short of a danger of impending US military action threatening his survival—Castro probably will continue and even expand his support of regional revolutionaries.

Soviet perception of the opportunities in Latin America created by the revolution in Nicaragua appears to have lagged Castro's. Subsequently, however, Moscow not only has backed Castro's return to militancy in Central America but has stepped up its own efforts to exploit instability and support Cuban activities in support of insurgents. Moscow almost certainly will continue to encourage and to underwrite Cuban assistance to insurgents—to maintain a degree of revolutionary momentum and to undermine the US position in the region. It also hopes to keep the United States embroiled in Latin America and with its allies in Western Europe over how to respond, and to exploit any resurrection of the Vietnam syndrome here. Only if the United States were to raise substantially the costs and risks to the Soviets of their troublemaking in the region would the Soviets pull back—and that could be only temporary—from their support for the insurgents, although US political pressures could lead Moscow to be more circumspect tactically. Soviet circumspection with respect to Latin American insurgencies, however, would not imply any reduction in Moscow's determination to retain its stake in Cuba. Any US military challenge to

Note: A subsequent edition of this Estimate will include the "Supporting Analysis."

1
~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

the Castro regime almost certainly would bring a major crisis in US-Soviet relations.¹

The Soviet-supported Cuban challenge to US regional interests will continue to be formidable. Cuba is supported by the revolutionary governments in Nicaragua and Grenada, and usually by Mexico. Prominent out-of-office leaders in a few other countries have close ties with Havana. Cuba has strong clandestine networks and sources of support among a spectrum of nationalists, leftists, and radicals; and social and economic pressures in many countries will present new opportunities for the growth of pro-Cuban radical movements.

Nationalism and suspicion of US intentions run high in Latin America, even in the more conservative countries, and have reduced the ability of the United States to direct events or to mobilize anti-Castro measures. However, greater US political, economic, and security involvement in the region—while not likely in the near term to alleviate substantially the root causes of instability—could shore up beleaguered governments, help bring about nonviolent change, and thus reduce Cuba's ability to gain the advantage.

¹ A forthcoming interagency intelligence paper will assess Soviet Latin American policy in greater detail, including the means and instruments that Moscow uses to encourage and support Havana's revolutionary policies.

~~SECRET~~

Latin America always has had high priority in Cuban foreign policy under Castro, despite substantial and active Cuban involvement in Africa and elsewhere in the Third World. Castro's persistent objective regarding Latin America and the Caribbean has been to undercut US influence and enhance his own, ultimately through the promotion of revolutionary governments that look to Havana for guidance. In addition to his commitment to revolutionary causes, Castro is influenced by his close ties with and dependence on the USSR, and is driven by his hostility toward and fear of the United States; he sees US and Cuban interests in the region as irreconcilable. In effect, therefore, he sees a compelling need to expand Cuba's influence in order to curb Washington's freedom of action to isolate and bring pressure on Havana.

The USSR holds similar objectives toward the region, though Moscow sees it as a less immediately important theater of its overall competition with the United States than does Havana. Because Castro supports the USSR's foreign policy goals generally and shares its objectives in Latin America specifically, it is difficult to assess the extent to which the USSR influences Cuba's regional policy. Cuba's extensive activities and the survival of Castro's regime itself ultimately depend on massive Soviet economic and military aid, and thus on Soviet approval. Because of the scope of shared objectives, as well as close consultations with Soviet officials and awareness of the limits of Moscow's tolerance, Cuba generally has had considerable latitude in implementing its policies. As a rule, Castro acts essentially on his own initiative in his home region, as contrasted with greater Soviet controls over Cuban activities in Africa and the Middle East. In the 1960s, this led to sharp tactical differences with Moscow over the utility of Cuban support for weak insurgent groups as opposed to cultivating good relations with moderate and conservative governments.

During most of the 1970s, while Castro followed the Soviet line of emphasizing diplomatic and commercial relations, he never renounced revolution. Two years ago—this time with Soviet approval—Cuba reverted to much more militant support of revolutionary insurgents, especially in Central America. At the same time, Castro has shown greater belligerence toward a number of other countries, especially Colombia and Ven-

ezuela. This sharp change in Cuban priorities reflects Castro's sense of greater potential for revolutionary victories through military force than he had envisioned before the success of the Sandinistas in Nicaragua in mid-1979.

Castro's emphasis on support of insurgencies also reflects his frustration over domestic problems, including a stagnant economy and serious deficiencies in housing, transportation, public services, food, and consumer goods. Popular frustration and widespread hardship have led the leadership—hardline elements of which have been strengthened by Cuban setbacks—to look to outside issues such as revolutionary duty, the threat to Cuban security, and solidarity with Third World compatriots as a diversion. New support for insurgencies also grows out of Castro's limited gains from cultivating regional governments, and from setbacks to his international prestige generally as a result of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

In short, Castro sees promising opportunities through promotion of insurgency to advance Cuban objectives in the region and to restore a sense of revolutionary momentum at home when little else seems to be working to his regime's advantage.

Despite the USSR's traditional caution regarding direct involvement in insurgency in Latin America, the Soviets too saw greater opportunities for advancing their interests in the region as a result of the Sandinista victory in Nicaragua. Beginning in 1980, Moscow not only backed Castro's return to militancy in Central America but also stepped up its own efforts to exploit instability and support Cuban efforts in support of insurgents—particularly through arranging for war supplies for Salvadoran leftist extremists. If the United States were substantially to raise the costs and risks to the Soviets of their troublemaking in the region, they would be likely to display for a time greater tactical prudence. Moscow would be likely to recommend tactical caution to Havana as well, and to underscore its strong desire to avoid a US-Cuban military confrontation.

Such a shift in Soviet tactics would not imply a change in long-term objectives to undercut and supplant US influence in Latin America, but simply a recognition of the obstacles to their ambitions under

3

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

present power realities in the region. Thus, Moscow almost certainly will continue to encourage and underwrite some measure of Cuban assistance to insurgents—to maintain a degree of revolutionary momentum, and also to keep the United States embroiled in Latin America and with its allies in Western Europe over how to respond, and to exploit any resurrection of the Vietnam syndrome here. Nor will tactical prudence on the part of the USSR necessarily imply any reduction in its determination to retain its stake in Cuba. In fact, Moscow is likely to see any serious threat to Cuba as a major crisis in US-Soviet relations. The recent sharp increase in Soviet military shipments to Cuba probably is intended to make this point, as well as provide for Cuban retransfer of arms to the Nicaraguan regime and to regional insurgents.

For their part, Cuban leaders are now more concerned about US countermeasures than at any time since the early 1960s. Castro is not convinced that the USSR would defend him against US military actions, especially in the absence of a formal defense treaty with the Soviets despite his efforts to get one. He sees Cuba as the vulnerable, exposed edge of the Communist world and a prime target for a US countermove against Soviet activities elsewhere. His expressions of concern during the invasion of Afghanistan and the Polish crisis bear witness to his worry. Thus, since late 1980, the Cubans have given signals of an interest in reducing bilateral tensions, primarily to avoid punitive US actions and secondarily to obtain economic benefits—a tactic they have employed early in preceding US administrations. Because of current heightened concern about US intentions, Castro has temporarily reduced the actual level of his support to Salvadoran insurgents and might do so to other regional revolutionaries. But his deepseated antagonism toward the United States has not diminished; and, as in the past, he almost certainly would not make any significant foreign policy concessions—including Cuba's right to support revolutionaries—to improve US relations. In fact, his most likely response to open US pressure would be to step up his troublemaking activities, to throw the United States onto the defensive.

Outlook

Castro, while mindful of US warnings and Soviet concern that he avoid actions that would provoke a US military response toward Cuba or a major US-USSR

crisis, probably will continue over the next year or so to provide strong backing to the revolutionary governments and movements Cuba now supports. The focus of his efforts will be in the Central American and Caribbean region, albeit with an eye on South America for opportunities. His assistance earlier this year to the M-19 insurgents in Colombia and his pressures on leftists in other countries to prepare for insurgency probably indicate that he continues to see militancy as the best course for keeping the United States at bay and for surviving any forceful showdown.

When diplomacy fails to achieve Cuba's objectives in a vulnerable country, Castro will attempt to exploit local economic and social problems, political instability, and points of tensions with the United States. This is done primarily through youth, labor, political, and cultural organizations that are sympathetic to Cuba, and front groups for radical elements. Cuba will also make good use of manpower-intensive developmental assistance to selected countries, earning good will and propagandizing at the same time. Although Cuba is hard currency poor, it can provide personnel-intensive aid such as doctors, teachers, construction workers, and disaster assistance. Considerable media and propaganda coverage is also provided, extolling the virtues of Cuba, the Soviet Union, and Communism, while criticizing the United States.

Use of Cuban combat forces in Latin America to assist insurgent groups is not anticipated in the near term. Despite such use in Angola and Ethiopia, Cuba and the Soviet Union do not consider the presence of Cuban troops there to constitute a direct provocation to US interests as Cuban troops in Latin America would. The greatest potential for the use of Cuban troops in the region would be in response to a serious threat to the Sandinista government in Nicaragua.

Nicaragua. Castro has more influence and prestige at stake in Nicaragua than he has ever had in a Latin American country. Havana will continue to provide extensive political, technical, and security support to solidify the revolutionary regime. Military equipment and training will be provided by both Cuba and the USSR. Castro's commitment to the regime's survival is so intense that he would be strongly motivated to use Cuban forces to defend the Sandinistas against a serious external or domestic challenge. Only fear of impending US military retaliation—especially if backed by urgent Soviet warnings—would deter him if he concluded Cuban intervention could quickly stabilize the situation.

4

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

El Salvador. The bold expansion of Cuban support for leftist extremist insurgents during 1980—especially provision of abundant military supplies in conjunction with the USSR, Nicaragua, and other countries—indicated Castro's eagerness to promote another revolutionary triumph. In response to US pressures, Cuba and Nicaragua have sharply cut back the flow of arms and ammunition. But other, less conspicuous forms of assistance have not been similarly reduced: guerrilla training, combat planning and intelligence support. Cuba will not abandon the insurgents and, even under sharper US pressures, Castro will probably arrange for sufficient external aid to underwrite the insurgents' continued potency as a disruptive and destructive force. He probably would consider a resumption of more generous and conspicuous support if the insurgents gain military and political momentum. He will also continue his campaign to discredit US assistance to the junta in world opinion. In any case, he probably hopes that expanded US involvement in El Salvador will increase Latin American and European political backing for the revolutionaries and thus provide protection for Havana against US retaliation.

Guatemala. Castro assigns less immediacy to the insurgency in Guatemala, which is not as advanced as the one in El Salvador. Nonetheless, Cuba will continue gradually and guardedly to expand its support to strengthen revolutionary groups. If the Salvadoran insurgents either succeeded in gaining control of the country or failed outright, Cuba would consider sharply expanding assistance to Guatemalan insurgents, to sustain revolutionary momentum in Central America.

Elsewhere in Latin America. Castro will continue to try to cultivate strong, friendly, supportive relationships with those countries he believes will best benefit Cuba's interests—for example, Mexico, which has supported the Nicaraguan Sandinistas and has criticized US policy in El Salvador. Panama, though seen as a less faithful friend, will also remain important to Cuba for political, economic, and intelligence purposes. At the same time, however, Castro's current hard line toward moderate and conservative governments, together with his militancy in Central America, has already strained relations with Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Venezuela, and a number of other countries in the region, some with which he had previously

sought to improve relations. He probably will increasingly view the hemisphere as polarized between groups of revolutionary and reactionary governments; increase Cuban criticism and low-risk actions aimed at undermining most conservative military regimes; and view most of the democratic governments as reactionary—with relations either remaining cool or deteriorating.

A number of factors—including Cuban and Soviet uncertainty about US intentions—will tend to restrain him from pushing confrontational policies even more vigorously and widely than at present. He may also be checked, at least in the near term, by the relative absence of revolutionary conditions and capabilities in some target countries, and by the prospects for legitimate changes in governments in the region that would be favorable to Cuba. Moreover, his more pragmatic advisers are likely to warn that more confrontations in the region would undercut Cuban chances for winning broad support for Central American insurgents.

We nonetheless believe that there is some chance—perhaps 20 percent—that Castro, in reaction to serious new domestic problems or foreign policy setbacks, will adopt more belligerent policies in Latin America generally than we have estimated. In such a situation he would conclude that increased hostility with the United States was inevitable, and would fatalistically accept the consequences of more aggressive pursuit of revolutionary breakthroughs. Cuba would then be even more eager than it is now to help leftist extremists to organize and launch armed revolt, and to employ purely vengeful and terrorist methods to weaken regional governments and undermine US interests. Such aggressive policies would tend to undercut Havana's overall objectives in Central America.

Paradoxically, the more prudent Castro's activities in support of Latin American revolutionaries, the more likely Cuba would be to make significant and lasting gains in the region. By patiently orchestrating broad political and international support for revolutionary movements, Castro would increase the costs to the United States of deterring their success, either in the target countries or by attempting directly to constrain Cuba.

But almost whatever course Castro follows in these respects, his challenge to US regional interests will continue to be formidable. Despite Cuba's many weak-

5

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

nesses, it retains considerable assets for furthering its interests:

- Massive military and economic support from the Soviet Union.
- It is supported by the revolutionary governments in Nicaragua and Grenada, and usually by Mexico.
- Prominent out-of-office leaders in Venezuela and a few other countries have close ties with Havana, and one or more of them may gain greater influence through elections during the next few years.
- Cuba has strong clandestine networks and sources of support among a spectrum of nationalists, leftists, and radicals throughout the region.

- Mounting social and economic pressures in many countries will present new opportunities for the growth of pro-Cuban radical movements.

- Nationalism and suspicion of US intentions run high, even in the more conservative countries, and have reduced the ability of the United States to direct events or to mobilize anti-Castro measures in the OAS or by other means.

Greater US political, economic, and security involvement in the region, while not likely in the near term to alleviate substantially the root causes of instability and the pressures for change, could work to reduce Cuba's ability to gain advantage—by helping to address pressures through nonviolent politics, by shoring up beleaguered governments, and by raising the costs and risks of Cuban militancy.

6

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

DISSEMINATION NOTICE

1. This document was disseminated by the National Foreign Assessment Center. This copy is for the information and use of the recipient and of persons under his or her jurisdiction on a need-to-know basis. Additional essential dissemination may be authorized by the following officials within their respective departments:

- a. Director of Intelligence and Research, for the Department of State
- b. Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, for the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
- c. Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, for the Department of the Army
- d. Director of Naval Intelligence, for the Department of the Navy
- e. Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, for the Department of the Air Force
- f. Director of Intelligence, for Headquarters, Marine Corps
- g. Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Intelligence Analysis, for the Department of Energy
- h. Assistant Director, FBI, for the Federal Bureau of Investigation
- i. Director of NSA, for the National Security Agency
- j. Special Assistant to the Secretary for National Security, for the Department of the Treasury
- k. The Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment for any other Department or Agency

2. This document may be retained, or destroyed by burning in accordance with applicable security regulations, or returned to the National Foreign Assessment Center.


3. When this document is disseminated overseas, the overseas recipients may retain it for a period not in excess of one year. At the end of this period, the document should be destroyed or returned to the forwarding agency, or permission should be requested of the forwarding agency to retain it in accordance with IAC-D-69/2, 22 June 1955.

4. The title of this document when used separately from the text is unclassified.

~~SECRET~~

This page is intentionally left blank.

Director of
Central
Intelligence



NFR

NIE 85/84/94-81

Cuban Policy Toward Latin America

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: FEB 2008

(b) (3)

National Intelligence Estimate
Volume II—Supporting Analysis

~~Secret~~

NIE 85/80/90-81
24 July 1981

Copy 277


22

Warning Notice
Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved
(WNINTEL)

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions

DISSEMINATION CONTROL ABBREVIATIONS

NOFORN-	Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals
NOCONTRACT-	Not Releasable to Contractors or Contractor/Consultants
PROPIN-	Caution—Proprietary Information Involved
NFIBONLY-	NFIB Departments Only
ORCON-	Dissemination and Extraction of Information Controlled by Originator
REL ...-	This Information Has Been Authorized for Release to ...
FGI-	Foreign Government Information



~~SECRET~~

NIE 85/80/90-81

CUBAN POLICY TOWARD
LATIN AMERICA

Volume II—Supporting Analysis

The present text provides supporting analysis
for the Estimate dated 23 June 1981.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

THIS SUPPORTING ANALYSIS IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD ON THE REFERENT ESTIMATE.

The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the Supporting Analysis:

The Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Treasury, and Energy.

Also Participating:

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

The Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, Marine Corps

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

CONTENTS

	<i>Page</i>
I. THE INTERNATIONAL SETTING.....	1
II. THE DOMESTIC CUBAN SETTING.....	2
III. SUPPORT FOR REVOLUTIONARY CHANGE.....	5
A. Cuban Doctrine.....	5
B. Support for Insurgent Groups.....	5
C. Revolutionary Governments.....	6
D. Progressive Governments and Movements.....	7
IV. THE SOVIET ROLE.....	9
V. PROSPECTS FOR CUBAN SUPPORT FOR REVOLUTION IN CENTRAL AMERICA.....	10
A. El Salvador and Guatemala.....	10
B. Nicaragua.....	11
VI. PROSPECTS FOR CUBAN POLICY AND RELATIONS ELSEWHERE IN LATIN AMERICA.....	12
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES	13
A. Relations With the United States.....	13
B. Castro's Extreme Option.....	14
C. Cuba and the Region.....	15

~~SECRET~~

This page is intentionally left blank.

~~SECRET~~

CUBAN POLICY TOWARD LATIN AMERICA

SUPPORTING ANALYSIS¹

I. THE INTERNATIONAL SETTING

1. The longstanding objective of Fidel Castro's policy toward Latin America and the Caribbean has been to undercut US influence and enhance his own, ultimately through the promotion of cooperative revolutionary governments. In addition to a deep commitment to revolutionary causes and a strong desire to expand his personal prestige, Castro's regional policy is influenced by his close ties with and dependence on the USSR. Castro's underlying attitude toward the United States is one of hostility and fear; and he sees US and Cuban interests in the region as irreconcilable. In effect, therefore, he sees a compelling need to expand Cuba's influence in order to curb Washington's freedom of action to isolate and bring pressure on Havana.

2. Over the past two years, the Castro government has sharply revised the emphasis and tactical priorities of its regional policy. In contrast to most of the period of the 1970s, Cuba is now giving much heavier emphasis to support of revolutionary insurgents, especially in Central America, and placing less importance on cultivation of diplomatic and commercial ties with moderate and conservative governments.

3. Changing perceptions of international threats and opportunities were probably one key factor that moved Cuban leaders to revise their regional policy. Cuba's international influence and prestige had never been higher than at the end of 1979, after nearly a decade of sustained and sometimes spectacular successes. Military interventions in Africa had markedly enhanced Havana's international standing, and a number of governments there and in other regions had come to borrow from Cuban organizational models, to emulate Cuban policies, and to solicit Cuban assistance.

4. In 1979, two of Castro's most sought-after foreign policy goals were achieved: his campaign to help create a sibling regime in the hemisphere was doubly

fulfilled, when pro-Cuban revolutionaries were victorious in Grenada and in Nicaragua; and, in September, he assumed the leadership of the nonaligned movement (NAM) at its summit in Havana. Buoyed by these and other victories, he traveled to the United Nations in October in a virtuoso role he had rehearsed for years, and was able with some credibility to pose as spokesman for the world's underprivileged and oppressed.

5. In the accomplishments of the 1970s, the original romantic and nationalistic impulses of Castro's foreign policy converged with the pro-Soviet policies that he had adopted in the 1960s. Because of his diplomatic and political skill, the burden of Cuba's increased dependence on the USSR and willingness to perform proxy services did not substantially undercut his maneuverability. Thus, Castro seemingly was able to perform simultaneously as a loyal Soviet ally, an eminent Latin American statesman, and a world-class spokesman for revolutionary and nonaligned causes.

6. Ironically, Castro was able to relish these triumphs for only a short time, before the delicate balance of his foreign policy was upset by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979. No event in more than a decade so unequivocally exposed Cuban subservience to the USSR and the limits that relationship imposes on Havana's ability to pursue an independent line. Cuba's dutiful endorsement of Soviet actions and its success in blocking efforts by some NAM members to censure Moscow have sharply undercut Castro's international prestige. Havana incurred almost immediate direct damage when it had to withdraw its candidacy for a coveted UN Security Council seat after it lost the support of a number of NAM countries, and its quest for a seat was frustrated again in late 1980. Castro's plans to exploit his three-year term as head of the NAM have also been badly damaged. As long as Soviet troops continue to occupy Afghanistan, he probably will have to be content to maintain a relatively defensive posture in the movement, to protect Soviet interests.

7. Moreover, heightened international tensions because of Afghanistan—and, more recently, Poland—

¹ Information as of 23 June 1981 was used in the preparation of Volume II—Supporting Analysis.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

have increased Cuban fears of the United States. Cuban leaders are more concerned than at any time since the early 1960s that Cuba could become a pawn in great-power rivalries. Castro is not convinced that the USSR would defend Cuba against US military actions, especially in the absence of a formal defense treaty with the Soviets despite his efforts to secure one. Cuban leaders realize their country is vulnerable as the most exposed salient of Soviet power and are alarmed that a consensus may be emerging in the United States in favor of tougher policies. Even before Afghanistan, Castro apparently had come to believe that US national security officials were attempting to contrive pretexts for punitive actions against Cuba. In 1980 he became even more concerned about the prospects for sharper confrontations with the United States under a Reagan administration.

8. Developments in Latin America have also helped to alter many of the assumptions and circumstances on which Cuban foreign policy was based during the 1970s. Even before Afghanistan, Castro had suffered a number of setbacks in the region that undermined the policies espoused by such leading pragmatists as Vice President and Politburo member Carlos Rafael Rodriguez. By the end of the decade, after efforts to negotiate commercial treaties with several major countries were rebuffed, Cuba's only significant trading partner in the region was Argentina.

9. The moderate policies that the Cuban regime pursued during the 1970s also fell short of achieving the important objective of cementing its legitimacy as a Latin American regional power. Although a majority of countries established diplomatic relations with Havana, Brazil and a number of others did not (see map). Havana's hopes to expand its influence with many of the governments with which it has formal relations have also been frustrated, especially in the Caribbean, because of fear of Cuban subversion. Castro has also had to accept the unpleasant reality that the benefits of carefully cultivated relations can be transitory. He was particularly irritated when the special relationship he had developed with Venezuela deteriorated after Luis Herrera Campins succeeded Carlos Andres Perez as president early in 1979.

10. Certain dramatic regional developments favorable to Cuban interests reinforced the pressures of these adverse developments in prompting a reappraisal of Cuba's regional doctrine, priorities, and methods. Thus, as the Sandinista guerrillas began

seriously to challenge the Somoza regime in Nicaragua by early 1979, Cuba's commitment to violent revolution as the preferred avenue to expanded influence began to intensify. The Sandinista success, the triumph via a coup of radical revolutionaries in Grenada, and the escalating violence in El Salvador and Guatemala presented Havana with enticing new opportunities for expanding its regional role precisely as the returns from the pragmatic policies of the 1970s were diminishing.

11. These revised calculations and Castro's anger and frustration arising from foreign and internal setbacks have evoked greater militancy in Havana's regional policy, which in turn has stimulated stronger fear of Cuba. Confrontations with the Bahamas, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela intensified already rising concern in the region over Cuba's military might and growing influence. In a sharp departure from his relatively conciliatory tactics of the 1970s, strident and repeated criticism by Castro and the Cuban media of about a dozen Latin American governments or leaders has further aggravated relations.

II. THE DOMESTIC CUBAN SETTING


12. Along with increasing international pressures, Cuban leaders have had to deal with escalating domestic problems over the last couple of years, which also contributed to Castro's frustrations and his interest in new policy departures. After two decades of revolutionary government, the economy is stagnant and dependent on massive Soviet assistance. Moscow provides the equivalent of about \$3 billion annually—about one quarter of estimated Cuban gross national product. Yet, living conditions remain austere. Most consumer goods, including food and clothing, are rationed, and popular items are frequently unavailable; housing, transportation, and other public services are seriously deficient. During 1980, the frustrations of both the population and the government increased: the first because of exposure to the well-being of visiting Cuban-Americans; the second because of setbacks to agricultural production from diseases and hurricane damage.

13. Warned by their leaders not to expect significant relief before the end of the century, Cubans in increasing numbers have become alienated. Worker productivity has declined during the last few years, corruption has spread, and crime has increased dra-

2

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~



CSX041 7 81

Unclassified

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

matically. We believe that well over 1 million Cubans would emigrate to the United States if they had the chance. We estimate that a few hundred thousand have formally applied to leave Cuba. As a rule, they have been stripped of their jobs and educational privileges, and at times their ration cards. They have become in effect an outcast minority, although recently the government has taken steps to reintegrate them.

14. A large number of the openly discontented belong to the post-Castro generation. It was widely presumed—in Cuba and abroad—that the ideals of the revolution had been successfully inculcated in the youth and that they constituted a bulwark of support for the regime. Many, however, after receiving preferential treatment while in school, are disillusioned when they enter the bleak job market and fully encounter unpleasant economic realities. Their disaffection and other evidence of popular apathy and disillusionment have angered and embarrassed Cuban leaders, because it discredits the government's pretensions that the Revolution has produced a thriving socialist society.

15. It was against this background that Castro decided to adopt harsh civil measures, and in December 1979 appointed Ramiro Valdes as Minister of Interior. Valdes, who previously served in the post during the 1960s, had earned a reputation as the regime's most prominent advocate of repressive measures. During the 1970s, he and the hardline policies associated with him were eclipsed by more pragmatic leaders and programs. Thus, his return at a time of increasing social unrest was a clear indication that Castro desired to pursue a tougher line internally. Policies aimed at reducing crime, vagrancy, occasional acts of sabotage, and other expressions of antiregime sentiment have been instituted. Valdes's penchant for brutality was evident last year, when block committees were mobilized to harass and physically attack would-be emigrants. Since then, however, some pragmatic innovations aimed at increasing productivity and morale through economic incentives have also been adopted.

16. Other hardline leaders concerned primarily with foreign affairs have probably also become more influential during the last couple of years. Manuel Pineiro is head of the America Department of the Communist Party's Central Committee with responsibility for coordinating relations with leftist and revolutionary groups in the hemisphere. While chief of the

foreign intelligence service during the 1960s, he directed Cuban subversive activities in Latin America and elsewhere. His cronies—most of whom also have close associations with Valdes—are concentrated in the intelligence and security establishment and the America Department. Several are ambassadors in Caribbean Basin countries.

17. Their special interest and expertise in Central America and the Caribbean date to efforts during the first months of the Castro government to sponsor revolutionary movements in that region. They have been more conspicuously represented there than in other areas of Cuban foreign policy. Thus, as conditions more conducive to revolution in Central America have emerged, Castro naturally has relied on them more. His trusted companions since the guerrilla campaign against the Batista regime in the 1950s, they are closer to him personally than leaders from other backgrounds. Their loyalty to him and to the revolutionary process as he defines it probably are the major elements of their political creed. Most of them also have close ties to Raul Castro and the defense establishment, and they frequently reflect his views on domestic and foreign affairs.

18. We believe that the hardliners hold that armed struggle is the only effective way to achieve revolutionary change and, thus, justify—less critically than other advisers—Cuban risks on behalf of insurgents. They probably are convinced that the "correlation of international forces" now favors the Communist camp and that objective conditions in several countries are more encouraging for revolutionaries than they have been in many years. Although they probably share with more pragmatic Cuban leaders a concern that the United States again may adopt punitive policies toward Cuba, they probably believe that US threats will strengthen domestic support for the Castro regime, and that US actions can be countered effectively. Over the longer run, they probably believe that the security of the Cuban regime can best be enhanced through the consolidation of revolutionary regimes elsewhere in the hemisphere.

19. Castro himself has been attracted to more active support for regional revolutionaries, in good measure because of his frustration and anger over domestic and foreign policy setbacks. Nonetheless, he has avoided any sweeping steps to upset the balance among his various advisers and leading interest groups. Officials accused of being "soft" toward crime have been

4
~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

replaced in all the top positions in the areas of internal security and justice, but pragmatists retain their influence and positions in other areas of the bureaucracy. None of the pragmatists has been disgraced, and there are no indications that Castro is considering a purge or is searching for scapegoats—although the influence of the pragmatists on foreign policy issues is in at least temporary decline.

III. SUPPORT FOR REVOLUTIONARY CHANGE

A. Cuban Doctrine

20. A cardinal tenet of the Castro government from its inception has been that support for revolutionaries elsewhere in Latin America is a right and a duty of the Cuban Revolution. The levels and types of support have fluctuated through the years, however, as revolutionary doctrine has adjusted to changing circumstances in Cuba and the region. During most of the 1960s, Cuba backed only groups that employed rural guerrilla methods, but after repeated failures—culminating in Che Guevara's death in one such campaign (in Bolivia in 1967)—Castro adopted the more flexible approaches advocated by Rodriguez and other pragmatists and urged on him by Moscow. The pragmatists' view—that revolutionaries should choose among various methods (including elections) to reach power—prevailed until the end of the 1970s. During that period, all forms of support for insurgents and terrorists in the hemisphere were at low levels, and nonviolent "patriots"—even priests, bishops, and generals—were praised as true revolutionaries.

21. In the most recent doctrinal shift, Castro once again seems to have reverted to the view that it is the duty of all revolutionaries to "make revolutions" through violent struggle. This more militant line was most explicitly enunciated in July 1980, in his speech on the anniversary of the Revolution. In the most forceful statement he has made on the subject of violence in over a decade, Castro said that "the experiences of Guatemala, El Salvador, Chile, and Bolivia teach us that there is no other way than . . . revolutionary armed struggle."

22. Unlike the situation in the 1960s, when similarly aggressive policies brought Cuba and the USSR into sharp doctrinal conflict, there is now at least a partial convergence on tactics, with both countries endorsing more militant methods in Central America. Authoritative Soviet spokesmen have questioned tradi-

tional doctrine that orthodox Communist parties must play the vanguard role in Latin American revolutionary struggles. Soviet authors have indicated that the most appropriate course—especially in Guatemala and El Salvador, where the Communist parties are eclipsed by more radical groups—is through the creation of broad political-military fronts. Parties that refrain from cooperation with other leftist forces have been criticized, and the Salvadoran Communists, who have adopted violent methods and broad front tactics, have been praised.

23. Like the Sandinista National Liberation Front, such amalgams are seen as a revolutionary vanguard in the hemisphere. Cuba and the USSR support the inclusion of "progressive" groups in such fronts with Communist parties and insurgent groups. Social democrats, socialists, advocates of liberation theology and other radical Catholic thought, as well as other quasi-Marxist leftists who are critical of the United States and of capitalism are considered sufficiently revolutionary—or malleable—to help carry out revolutionary change, particularly in Central America. In addition to other benefits, this approach attracts West European support for Latin American revolutionaries. In contrast, Castro's antipathy toward Christian Democratic and other center-left reform parties seems to have intensified during the last year or two.

24. These and other changes in Cuban revolutionary doctrine have had diverse repercussions among the Latin American Communist parties. Some have hastened to conform, while others have either hesitated to change their longstanding policies against violent struggle or have divided over the issue. The main Guatemalan party thus far has refused to join in the Cuban-sponsored unity talks among guerrilla groups, or to condone insurgent methods. The Honduran and Costa Rican parties have split over the issue of violence.

B. Support for Insurgent Groups

25. El Salvador and Guatemala are the high-priority targets of Cuban subversive efforts. Virtually all types of support to the insurgents have increased during the last year or so, including a dramatic upsurge in assistance to Salvadoran revolutionaries during 1980. Statements by Castro and other evidence indicate, in addition, that Cuba's interest in insurgent and radical groups extends to several other countries. Even in Chile and Colombia, where the prospects for

5

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

near-term revolutionary success are slight, Havana now is apparently committed to the primacy of violent methods and to assisting radicals in organizing more effective opposition to the present governments. Cuban interest in expanding ties with and influence over the extreme left in Bolivia, the Dominican Republic, and probably a few other countries also has sharpened.

26. Havana's commitment to assist the revolutionary process in El Salvador has been trumpeted publicly with little equivocation since early 1980. Cuban leaders believe that the potential for another revolutionary success is greater there than anywhere in Latin America, and the prospects of another pro-Cuban regime in Central America is a powerful inducement to help. Castro has played an important role in persuading the five Salvadoran guerrilla groups to establish a joint political-military directorate and to collaborate with "progressive" political groups. Cuba's propaganda support for the extreme left and its backing of international initiatives against the government have also intensified.

27. Cuba, the USSR, and Nicaragua during 1980 orchestrated a major supply effort that transformed the formerly ragtag Salvadoran insurgents into a relatively well-armed and well-equipped force. The deliveries—mostly originating in Eastern Europe, Ethiopia, and Vietnam—included semiautomatic and automatic rifles, machineguns, recoilless rifles, mortars, and rocket-propelled grenades, as well as explosives, uniforms, medical supplies, and communications gear. We estimate, in addition, that during the last year or so, over 1,000 Salvadorans have received guerrilla training in Cuba and from Cuban advisers in Nicaragua. Cubans also assist the insurgents in the areas of combat planning, intelligence, and tactics, essentially from within Nicaragua, but probably through field trips to El Salvador as well.

28. Cuba's commitment to insurgent groups in Guatemala and efforts to gain greater influence over them have also increased over the last year. Havana has put pressure on leaders of the four principal guerrilla organizations to enter into a "popular and democratic front." Rivalries and tactical differences among the guerrilla chieftains remain strong, however, and impede Cuba's continuing unification efforts. Several hundred Guatemalans have received military training in Cuba, and a small number of Cuban advisers apparently have been in the field for short periods

with Guatemalan guerrillas. The growth of Cuban propaganda in support of the revolutionary left has paralleled these developments; and efforts, largely through diplomatic channels and in international forums, to discredit and isolate the Lucas government have increased.

29. Armed revolution in Honduras has also become a long-term Cuban objective. This is in sharp contrast to policies pursued by Cuba during the 1970s, when the Castro regime periodically made overtures to Honduran military leaders with the apparent objective of establishing commercial and perhaps diplomatic ties. Cuba's change of policy probably helped precipitate a split in the Honduran party in 1980, when about half of the members organized a separate group that espouses violent methods. Cuba provides Honduran revolutionaries with guerrilla training and increased propaganda support. Cuban leaders are urging Honduran Communists to reunite, and Havana meanwhile maintains influence with both the orthodox and break-away group.

30. In addition, Havana has helped exiled revolutionaries return to Chile during the last year or so, in hopes of resurrecting revolutionary struggle against the Pinochet government. The guerrillas—members of the Movement of the Revolutionary Left, who for years were discouraged by Havana—probably intend to do rudimentary organizational work and to engage in sporadic terrorism that could result in more unified attempts to undermine the military regime. Although there are no insurgent groups in Bolivia today, official statements strongly suggest that Havana would like to help organize violent opposition to the military government.

31. Recently, Colombia was added to the list of countries where Cuban assistance is sharpening the challenge of revolutionary insurgents. Havana helped train, arm, and transport M-19 insurgents—who previously had concentrated on urban terrorism—in their efforts, early in 1981, to open rural guerrilla fronts.

C. Revolutionary Governments

32. As support for violent revolution has increased, Castro has also reverted to more demanding definitions of revolutionary processes and governments. After Generals Velasco of Peru and Torrijos of Panama took power in 1968, populist and reform regimes were often viewed favorably in Havana. Castro consi-

~~SECRET~~

dered them "revolutionary" because they adopted nationalistic positions on such issues as foreign ownership in their countries, supported the NAM's international policies, and voiced criticism of the United States. Cuban doctrine became even more pragmatic following the election of Marxist Salvador Allende to the Chilean presidency in 1970. Rebellion was no longer the sole means of winning revolutionary power, assault on the class structure was not an immediate priority, and Marxist or socialist ideology was not essential.

33. The Cuban leadership now appears to believe that only leaders who win or consolidate power through violent means, and who eliminate the military and other power centers that could force them from office, can achieve a genuine revolution. In this revised view, revolutionary governments should at least be inclined toward Marxism and should consider Cuba, and by extension the USSR, as their natural allies and be willing to demonstrate this preference publicly by taking strong "anti-imperialist" stands. By these more stringent standards, only the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua and the Bishop government in Grenada qualify as revolutionary.

34. Since the coup led by Maurice Bishop in Grenada, Havana has been the dominant foreign influence in that small East Caribbean nation. About 250 Cubans are helping in the construction of a new international airport, and Cuban teachers, medical personnel, military, security, and other advisers are at work there. An unknown number of Grenadian students are receiving training in Cuba, and Bishop and other leaders of his New Jewel Movement are attracted to Cuban political and social models. Grenada's reflexive support for Cuban international positions was illustrated in early 1980, when it was the only other Western Hemisphere government to vote against the UN resolution condemning the invasion of Afghanistan.

35. It is in Nicaragua, nonetheless, where Cuba has made the most dramatic progress in inspiring and helping to mold a sibling revolutionary process. Cuban influence is more pervasive there than it has ever been in a Latin American country, especially through the presence of from 5,000 to 6,000 Cubans who are active in virtually all areas of public life. Numerous high-level Sandinistas, perhaps including the members of their nine-man National Directorate—the ultimate ruling body in Nicaragua—are assigned Cuban advisers.

36. Although the Sandinista leaders have been wary of repeating mistakes made by Castro during the initial stages of the Cuban Revolution (open conflict with the United States, emigration of the middle-classes), they have moved aggressively to consolidate their power with a strategy drawn directly from Cuban experience. Cuban military and security personnel are assisting the Sandinistas to organize effective internal control mechanisms. More than 1,000 military advisers provide training in leadership, organization, tactics, and military sciences. All seven Sandinista regional military commanders have personal Cuban advisers, and a number of other officers probably do as well. Cuban security, intelligence, and police advisers are helping to organize the Nicaraguan Interior Ministry, the police and intelligence forces, and the people's militia. Military and intelligence training is also provided in Cuba.

37. We believe the two countries are bound by a secret mutual defense pact that provides for Cuban assistance in the event of foreign aggression against the Nicaraguan Government. Both regimes probably also interpret the agreement as a Cuban pledge for support if the Sandinistas are threatened by internal opposition. Consistent with this alliance, Cuba has supplied modern arms and equipment, in cooperation with the USSR, to upgrade Nicaragua's military capabilities.

38. Cuban advice and assistance penetrate many areas of Nicaraguan civilian life as well. The largest effort is educational. Approximately 2,000 Cuban teachers operate in institutions throughout Nicaragua. Over 1,000 Nicaraguan teenagers participate in work-study programs in Cuba, and others are attending Cuban specialty schools. Cuba has provided from 200 to 300 medical personnel, an estimated 750 construction workers who are engaged in roadbuilding and other public works projects, and several hundred advisers who are assigned to various Nicaraguan Government agencies. The Marxist content of much of the Cuban training has become a matter of controversy with the Nicaraguan Catholic Church, and in other sectors.

D. Progressive Governments and Movements

39. The Mexican Government, and occasionally the Panamanian, occupy a special category in Cuban rhetoric because they are considered "progressive." The two have frequently joined Nicaragua and Grenada in support of Cuban initiatives. In Castro's view,

7

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

"progressive" regimes have attained an intermediate stage of "liberation from imperialism." In contrast to the moderate doctrines he held during the 1970s, however, Castro apparently now holds that even "progressive" regimes must complete their development by advancing through a more radical and violent stage, which presumably would eliminate conservative influence and result in encompassing redistributions of wealth and power.

40. Since the mid-1970s, Mexico's increasingly independent and energetic foreign policy has often paralleled Cuba's. President Lopez Portillo dramatically demonstrated his willingness to bolster Castro's sagging prestige when he visited Cuba last August and called for an end of the US trade embargo and use of Guantanamo. Mexican governments for years have supported in principle the need for revolutionary change in Latin America, and many top officials believe it is inevitable in Central America.

41. Mexico over the past year has developed close ties with revolutionary groups in El Salvador and has come close to breaking relations with the junta government. It is providing economic and political assistance to the Sandinistas, is pressing Guatemalan leaders to broaden the base of their support, and is courting other countries in Central America and the Caribbean with offers of political backing and guaranteed oil supplies. Mexico's rising interest in the area has a double edge for Cuba, nevertheless. It poses a challenge to long-term Cuban objectives by using its energy wealth to promote a politically pluralistic and economically pragmatic alternative to the beleaguered Cuban system.

42. Although Castro and the Cuban media sometimes depict the Torrijos government as "progressive," relations with Panama are motivated by abiding cynicism on both sides. Castro no longer has any illusions that Torrijos will become a dependable Cuban ally, or that he will institute fundamental social reforms. Castro also realizes that Torrijos and other Panamanian leaders continue to place their relationship with the United States above all others. Castro has been disappointed, moreover, that Torrijos—who worked with Cuba against the Somoza regime—has played both sides in El Salvador rather than lending unqualified support to the insurgents. Torrijos maintains contact with revolutionaries throughout Central America and provides some of them with clandestine support. But he is less inclined now to collaborate with

Havana in these efforts, because of concern about Cuba's growing influence in the area.

43. Relations with Panama are of considerable importance to Havana. Cuba evades the US embargo by purchasing a substantial amount of consumer goods, spare parts, and other equipment in the Colon Free Zone, in good part through front companies. Cuba operates banks in Panama City and maintains its Pacific fishing fleet headquarters at a Panamanian port which now provides the only access on the west coast to the rich Pacific fishing grounds. Panama is also an important center for Cuban clandestine activities, and a liaison with Panamanian intelligence officials provides Havana with useful information and access.

44. Developments in Jamaica, where the moderate Labor Party unseated the "progressive" government of Michael Manley in elections last year, have probably contributed to Castro's renewed emphasis on the primacy of violent methods. Under Manley, Jamaica moved steadily closer to Havana and became the centerpiece of Cuba's policy of expanding its influence in the Caribbean. Before the elections, some Cuban leaders probably hoped that Manley and radicals in his ruling party would abandon the Westminster political system, in order to preserve their power indefinitely. Now Castro has resigned himself to the loss of an important friend and to a broad deterioration of relations with Jamaica under the Labor government.

45. Elsewhere in the Caribbean, Cuba's efforts to increase its influence and to promote "progressive" leaders and groups have had mixed results. Havana employs generally cautious political and propaganda techniques to augment its standing with labor and youth groups and with intellectuals and selected political figures, especially in the English-speaking countries. Assistance programs aimed primarily at those sectors are also designed to advertise Cuban organizational and development models. Cuban leaders most likely are disappointed with the results of their efforts in countries other than Grenada, however, and appear to have underestimated the resiliency of democratic and conservative traditions in the area. Castro is probably optimistic, nonetheless, that long-term trends in the Caribbean favor progressive or revolutionary change and an expansion of Cuban influence; and he continues to probe for advantage in such openings as the unstable military government in Suriname and the preindependence government of Belize.

8

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

IV. THE SOVIET ROLE :

46. The Soviet Union and Cuba share similar objectives regarding Latin America and the Caribbean: to embroil the United States and to undercut its influence while enhancing their own, ultimately through the advent of cooperative revolutionary governments. The extent to which Moscow influences Havana's regional policy, therefore, is difficult to assess. Cuba's extensive activities, and the survival of the Castro regime, ultimately depend on massive Soviet economic and military aid, and thus on Soviet approval. Castro pays heed both to Soviet interests and to the limits of Moscow's tolerance on tactical matters. As a rule, however, Castro acts essentially on his own initiative in Latin America, as contrasted with greater Soviet controls over Cuban activities in Africa and the Middle East.

47. Over the years Moscow has placed a lower priority on the region and sees it as a less immediately important component of its competition with the United States than does Havana. The Soviets have more consistently sought to develop diplomatic and commercial ties with existing governments as a means of expanding influence. Until recently, Moscow had not encouraged the small orthodox Communist parties to engage in violence and had not given much direct support to the groups that have turned to insurgency. As previously indicated, Havana's aggressive support of insurgents in the 1960s caused sharp conflict with Moscow, in good measure because the Soviets saw such support as premature and as damaging to the interests of the orthodox Communist parties. Castro's cutback in aid to insurgents during the 1970s was largely in response to Soviet pressures.

48. Castro's vigorous support of Central American revolutionaries since 1979 probably is essentially a Cuban initiative, but one which the Soviets have encouraged as now more consistent with their own objectives. Moscow apparently expects and prefers Havana to take the lead in advancing regional revolutionary causes—both in deference to Castro's greater understanding of local political dynamics and to shield the Soviets from a backlash from the United States and from the larger Latin American countries where they have a bilateral stake. Thus, other than their general

¹ A forthcoming interagency intelligence paper will assess Soviet Latin American policy in greater detail, including the means and instruments that Moscow uses to encourage and underwrite Havana's policies in support of revolutionary movements and governments.

underwriting of the Cuban economy and military establishment, the Soviets played a relatively minor role in promoting the Nicaraguan insurgency.

49. The Sandinista success in 1979 probably both surprised and impressed the Soviets. Not only did Cuba largely supplant US influence, but in a country where Moscow had had no official representation it soon enjoyed diplomatic, economic, cultural, military, and even party-to-party ties. Soviet leaders apparently concluded that the prospects for the success of revolutionary forces in Central America were brighter than they had calculated, that the United States was unable to counter these forces effectively, and that greater Soviet attention to the area was therefore justified.

50. Under this revised perspective, the Soviet attitude toward armed struggle in Central America shifted. Moscow urged the Central American Communist parties to form military units and to join more powerful insurgent groups in broad political and military fronts. For the first time in many years, local Communists were provided with guerrilla training in the Soviet Union. The most dramatic indication of this upgrading in Soviet interest was Moscow's effort in 1980 to arrange for broad support to the Salvadoran insurgents, especially arms and military equipment from four East European countries, from Ethiopia and Vietnam, and from the Palestine Liberation Organization. Moscow also provided directly some logistic support and probably some funds to the supply operation.

51. If the United States were substantially to raise the costs and risks to the Soviets of their troublemaking in the region, they would be likely once again to reassess the costs and benefits of their activities in support of insurgents. There are some indications that Moscow now sees reduced short-term prospects for new revolutionary successes and greater risk of damage to the entire range of interests at stake in US-Soviet relations. In Latin America, the Soviets would wish to avoid provoking intense US pressures against Nicaragua and especially Cuba, and any crisis with the United States that would erode the benefits Moscow derives from ties with such key countries as Argentina and Brazil (foodstuffs and other trade), Mexico (political and diplomatic), and Peru (military sales).

52. In short, the Soviets would be likely to adopt more circumspect tactics to exploit opportunities in the region if the United States seemed ready to

9
~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

exercise its political and military advantages. While the change could prove short lived, Moscow would be likely to avoid sharp increases in its own limited direct assistance to insurgents, and to employ greater discretion in efforts to stimulate assistance from Eastern Europe and other nonregional sources. The Soviets, moreover, would be likely to recommend greater tactical prudence to Havana and to underscore their strong desire to avoid a US-Cuban military confrontation. But subject to these constraints, Moscow almost certainly will continue to encourage and support some level of Cuban assistance to insurgents—to maintain a degree of revolutionary momentum in the region, to keep the United States embroiled there and with its allies in Western Europe over how to respond, and to exploit any resurrection of the Vietnam syndrome in the United States.

53. Such a shift in tactics by the Soviets would not imply a change in long-term objectives to erode and supplant US influence in Latin America, but simply a recognition of the obstacles to their ambitions under present power realities in the region. Nor would tactical prudence on the part of the USSR necessarily imply any reduction in its determination to retain its stake in Cuba. In fact, Moscow is likely to see any US military threat to the Castro regime as a major crisis in US-Soviet relations. The recent sharp increase in Soviet military shipments to Cuba probably is intended to make this point, as well as to facilitate the supply of arms to the Nicaraguan regime and to regional insurgents. In addition to other measures, Moscow would be likely to counter such a threat by increasing its efforts to create anti-US pressures throughout Latin America.

V. PROSPECTS FOR CUBAN SUPPORT FOR REVOLUTION IN CENTRAL AMERICA

A. El Salvador and Guatemala

54. The strengthening of the revolutionary regime in Nicaragua and promotion of revolutionary insurgencies, especially in El Salvador and Guatemala, will probably continue as the paramount objectives of Cuba's regional policy during the next year or two. Cuban leaders almost certainly will persist in their efforts to broaden and bolster the political-military fronts and guerrilla groups they back in El Salvador and Guatemala, and they probably will employ similar tactics in attempting to stimulate the still-nascent revolutionary forces in Honduras. Covert action, prop-

aganda, and diplomatic initiatives aimed at isolating and subverting the military-dominated governments of the three countries, and at generating international support for revolutionary movements, are almost certain to continue at present or higher levels.

55. We estimate that Havana will continue to provide insurgents in El Salvador with supplies of small arms, munitions, and other light military equipment as well as training and planning and intelligence support. At a minimum Castro probably will underwrite sufficient external support to sustain the insurgents' capabilities for debilitating and destabilizing small-unit raids, terrorism, and economic sabotage. He probably hopes that expanded US involvement will increase Latin American and European support for the revolutionaries and provide cover for continued Cuban support operations.

56. Other types of support are also likely to be provided by Havana, especially if the prospects of revolutionary movements improve in El Salvador and Guatemala. We believe that Cuban advisers have been temporarily assigned to assess the needs of insurgents in both countries and that there is a good chance that some have remained in El Salvador since the January 1981 insurgent offensive. If fighting intensifies in Guatemala and larger amounts of Cuban materiel are sent, some Cuban advisers may remain with the guerrillas there also.

57. We believe the Cubans have also been instrumental in arranging the participation on the side of the Salvadoran insurgents of small numbers of combatants from Nicaragua, Costa Rica, and other Latin American countries. These international "volunteers" are intended to assist diplomatically as well as militarily, by underscoring the "legitimacy" of the revolutionary cause. Cuba most likely will try to enlarge the role of these international "brigadistas" incrementally.

58. Decisions involving these and other forms of relatively inconspicuous support are likely to be made by Castro largely on the basis of his evaluations of the needs and prospects of Central American revolutionary movements. Consideration of a more blatantly interventionist policy in El Salvador—including some combination of greatly increased assistance in the form of arms, materiel, advisers, and international "volunteers"—will be influenced by his assessment of likely US reactions and other external forces and circumstances that tend to constrain him.

10

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

59. Changes in the regional and international environment since 1979 have diminished Castro's maneuverability and credibility and have made it more difficult for him to marshal direct Latin American support for violent revolution. A number of governments and leaders have been soured by the course of postrevolutionary events in Nicaragua and have become more suspicious and critical of Cuba; and several that collaborated with Havana or acquiesced in its support of the Sandinistas now often work against Cuban interests in Central America.

60. Castro is restrained in particular by the reluctance of other governments in the region to break relations with the Salvadoran and Guatemalan regimes or to provide unqualified public support for the insurgents. During the Salvadoran guerrilla offensive in January, and on other occasions, Mexico was under popular pressure to recognize the revolutionary front but relations with the junta government continue. Panamanian officials also have close ties with Salvadoran leftists and have provided them with clandestine support while maintaining diplomatic relations with the government. If these or other Latin American governments were publicly to switch sides in Central America, Cuban objectives and prospects for eventual victory by revolutionary forces would be considerably enhanced.

61. Paradoxically, Castro may realize that his hopes that Mexico eventually will support revolutionary fronts in Central America may best be advanced by avoiding more conspicuous or confrontational Cuban involvement. Mexico's long border with Guatemala traverses some of its most backward areas; and military and other relatively conservative leaders probably are concerned about a spillover of revolutionary sentiment and activities. Apprehensions about Cuban activities most likely would be aroused in Mexico if revolutionary violence were to increase in Guatemala to the extent it has in El Salvador, and if Cuban support for Guatemalan insurgents seemed to enhance their prospects significantly. In that event, the Mexican perspective of seeing a need for revolution in Central America would probably be modified to take account of more practical concerns.

B. Nicaragua

62. Castro's determination to promote insurgency in El Salvador and Guatemala is also complicated by his even more intense determination to protect the

revolutionary regime in Nicaragua. He has seen that conspicuous use of Nicaragua as a base of support before the January offensive in El Salvador produced sharp strains in Managua's relations with the United States. This could lead to a retraction of desperately needed Western economic aid and increased opposition to the Sandinistas at home. Castro's hardline advisers probably counsel that confrontation between Managua and Washington is inevitable under the Reagan administration and that a much more serious challenge to the Sandinista government would result if the Salvadoran insurgency collapsed.

63. Starting in February, and apparently with Cuban approval, the Sandinistas sharply reduced the flow of war supplies to El Salvador, in response to US pressures. The flow has recently begun to expand somewhat over new, more circuitous routes. Large war stocks intended for the Salvadoran insurgents still are stored in Nicaragua and fresh supplies probably continue to arrive via Cuba. Both Cuba and Nicaragua remain committed to the success of the Salvadoran insurgents, and—though wary of US countermeasures—will continue to work to augment the supply flow.

64. In any case, Cuban support for Nicaragua will concentrate during the next year or so on assisting the Sandinistas to tighten their political control of the country. Military, security, and intelligence forces and mass organizations responsive to Sandinista dictates—all patterned closely on Cuban models—will be strengthened. Cuban support, especially in the military and security fields, is already increasing, including more sophisticated equipment supplied from Cuban inventories and transhipped from the USSR. Castro is likely, furthermore, to urge key Sandinistas to establish more effective and centralized control over their movement and to isolate or remove suspected "counterrevolutionaries." Thus, reported Cuban counsel to avoid confrontations with the private sector, the Church, and Western foreign aid donors will continue to be contingent on the Sandinistas' ability to control all the essential levers of power in Nicaragua.

65. Castro's commitment to the survival of the Sandinista regime is so strong that he would probably be willing to take substantial risks to defend it and to sustain major damage in his foreign policy generally by doing so. If the Sandinista government were seriously challenged by either Nicaraguan insurgents or foreign military forces, we believe that Castro would

~~SECRET~~

be strongly motivated to defend it by supplying Cuban troops. He could probably be deterred if he thought that US military retaliation were likely, or if he encountered strong Soviet opposition. In addition, he would be concerned about inserting Cuban military forces in a conflict in Nicaragua that could result in large numbers of casualties, particularly Cuban, or in a prolonged struggle. He probably hopes that if the Sandinistas are challenged, Cuban military and security personnel already stationed in Nicaragua could provide enough help without the need for reinforcements from Cuba. With this—and his objectives in El Salvador—in mind, he probably has already augmented those forces over the past year.

VI. PROSPECTS FOR CUBAN POLICY AND RELATIONS ELSEWHERE IN LATIN AMERICA

66. Castro is likely to receive conflicting advice on the preferred course of Cuban relations outside of Central America. His pragmatic advisers are likely to counsel that further antagonizing these governments would undermine his Central American objectives of fostering revolution at low risk of US counteraction. His hardline advisers will have little patience with this reasoning and will recommend continuation of recent belligerent regional policies.

67. We think Castro will tend to view the hemisphere as polarized between groups of friendly and antagonistic governments. Denunciations of military-dominated regimes in South America have become more frequent and mordant over the last year. Attacks on the military governments of Chile, Bolivia, Uruguay, and Paraguay have increased, and propaganda as well as covert and diplomatic efforts aimed at isolating and undermining them could become a more important element of Cuban policy during the next few years. Cuban criticism of the Brazilian Government has been muted, however, and is not likely to increase appreciably.

68. Argentina is the outstanding exception to this policy, nonetheless, and probably will remain so at least in the short term. Cuba continues to draw against a \$1.2 billion Argentine Government credit, negotiated in 1973 with the Peron regime to purchase a variety of industrial goods. Largely because of the economic benefits from the relationship, the two countries have overlooked fundamental political and

ideological differences and other problems since 1976, when the Argentine military returned to power. Those benefits are likely to remain the principal determinant of relations over the next few years, although more conspicuous Cuban support for violent revolution in the hemisphere would add new strains.

69. Castro will work hard to preserve good relations with Mexico, which he sees as his key regional ally in restraining the United States. In Panama, while increasingly disdainful of Torrijos's susceptibility to US pressures, he will probably work to keep relations from worsening, because of Cuba's valuable intelligence and trade links there. We believe that Castro will tend to perceive most of the elected civilian governments in the region as allied with the United States and "reactionary" interests, and that he will adopt more critical, and in a few cases more antagonistic, policies toward them. Evidence of Cuban support for the M-19 has recently led the Colombian Government to suspend relations with Havana.

70. Relations between Cuba and the Social Christian government in Venezuela have deteriorated rapidly over the past year; in the autumn of 1980 Cuba withdrew all of its official representatives from Caracas. Rising enmity and escalating differences between the two governments have increased the probability that they will adopt even more hostile policies toward each other.

71. For his part, Castro probably will attempt to weaken the Herrera administration through the use of sharper propaganda and criticism in international caucuses. In these circumstances, the prospects would rise that Cuba will seek to expand its ties with the small and divided guerrilla groups and other leftists in Venezuela in the hope of helping to promote an effective radical opposition force.

72. Relations with Costa Rica have also been severely strained since 1980. The Carazo government had cooperated with Castro in supporting the Sandinista insurgency, but subsequently grew alarmed about the extent of Cuban influence in Nicaragua and its intentions elsewhere in the region. San Jose broke off consular relations with Havana in May 1981, and bilateral tensions will probably not soon be relieved.

73. Castro probably has few illusions about the prospects for expanding Cuban influence with the civilian governments in Ecuador and Peru or for developing beneficial commercial ties. Havana's hopes

~~SECRET~~

to establish a fishing center in Ecuador have been frustrated, and the Quito government is not inclined to expand relations beyond their current minimal level. Castro probably does not expect to be able to restore the affinity with Peru that developed when General Velasco was in power, but he has refrained from harsh criticism of the Belaunde government. Moreover, relations with both countries have been strained over incidents involving Cubans seeking asylum in the Havana embassies. We believe that Havana will endeavor to maintain normal state-to-state relations with both countries, but there is a chance it will also lend propaganda support to the creation of broad "anti-imperialist" fronts there during the next year or two.

74. Cuban relations with the Labor Party government in Jamaica almost certainly will be strained and could become conflictual. Castro strongly desires that the moderate Seaga government not succeed with Western backing in bringing a measure of prosperity and stability to the Island. This would not only show up Manley's pro-Cuban approach, but would strengthen the hold of moderates throughout the English-speaking Caribbean. Especially if Jamaican radicals show potential for confronting the government, Castro will lend encouragement and assistance.

75. Castro will be constrained from aggressively pushing more confrontational policies in these and other regional countries and from allowing state-to-state relations to deteriorate sharply by a variety of international and domestic forces. He is likely to be restrained by Moscow's probable preference that he avoid provoking a major crisis with the United States and the larger Latin American nations in pursuit of adventurist policies.

76. Influential groups of Cuban officials strongly prefer that he concentrate his and the regime's energies on Cuba's enormous domestic problems rather than on a more stressful foreign policy. Soviet leaders would almost certainly be dismayed if Rodriguez and his associates—who have been Moscow's most trusted intermediaries with other Cuban leaders—were to be eclipsed by hardliners. Many of the latter probably are still viewed critically in Moscow because of the policies they pursued during the 1960s.

77. Castro is also likely to be generally constrained by a longer term view of Cuban prospects in Latin America. Even where tension and confrontations have marred relations with other countries, he probably

hopes that leaders more sympathetic to Cuba and its policies will replace those currently in power. He may hope, for instance, that more "progressive" leaders will win elections during the next few years in Venezuela, Costa Rica, and the Dominican Republic. Cuban leaders have close relations with officials of opposition parties, such as Accion Democratica in Venezuela, and with more "progressive" factions of governing parties. Castro can be expected to seek expansion of these ties and to weigh future policy decisions regarding those countries with an eye on how they might affect the prospects of groups he favors.

VII. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES

78. In addition to Cuban domestic politics, events in Latin America and Havana's relationships there, and support and pressures from Moscow, US policy toward Cuba and the rest of Latin America will have an important impact on Havana's regional policies. First, developments in US-Cuban relations are likely to influence the Castro regime's regional game plan—not its ultimate objectives, but matters of priorities, timing, and tactics. Second, US policies toward Latin America, including US responses to Cuban activities, will affect Castro's appraisal of the potential benefits and costs of whatever policies he pursues.

A. Relations With the United States

79. Castro repeatedly indicated last year that he desired talks with the Carter administration on the full range of bilateral issues. His pragmatic advisers have long advocated the benefits of a reduction of tensions and limited rapprochement, and several actions taken by Cuba last fall were intended to relieve tensions and probably to enhance President Carter's chances for reelection. Castro's central objective probably is to win implicit or explicit assurances that the United States will not initiate hostile actions against Cuba or the revolutionary governments and movements it supports. As previously indicated, Cuban leaders sense a growing sentiment in the United States for a tougher anti-Cuban policy, though the pragmatists, at least, probably believe that the Reagan administration should be probed to see if the late 1980 progress toward reduced tensions can be resumed.

80. Castro has used such probes early in preceding US administrations. He is also interested in winning an

13

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

end of the trade embargo, acquiring a market in the United States for Cuban goods, terminating US reconnaissance overflights, arranging a reliable means for exporting disgruntled Cubans, and, ultimately, in gaining US evacuation of the Guantanamo Naval Base. He probably has no coherent negotiating strategy, however, and may believe that he can gain some of his objectives without making major concessions in return. From his point of view, again, even US recognition of Cuba's agenda of bilateral irritants would serve to increase the legitimacy and security of his regime.

81. In our view, there is no reason to believe that Castro's antagonism toward the United States has diminished or that he would make significant concessions in areas of major concern. We believe it highly unlikely that he would agree to reduce or even be willing to discuss his commitment to the USSR, or that there is much flexibility in Cuban policies and doctrine in other critical areas. We believe, moreover, that he will continue to place a higher priority on promoting revolutionary change—particularly in Central America—than on improving relations with the United States.

82. To foster serious bilateral negotiations, Castro might temporarily reduce the actual level of Cuban support to regional revolutionaries, and he would be less likely to opt for the more openly confrontational policies in Latin America preferred by his hardline advisers. But even in the event of reduced Cuban-US tensions, he would still not trust the United States; and he would continue to be attracted to strengthening the revolutionary governments and insurgencies he sees both as the key to lasting security from US pressures and as a means to justify and possibly increase Soviet aid and support for Cuba.

83. US rejection of negotiations and increased US nonmilitary pressures would give Castro some pause (as seems to be the case in the reduced level of his aid to Salvadoran insurgents), but not force him to back down for long or to forgo probes for new revolutionary opportunities (as recently in Colombia). Castro's reaction to US military threats is more difficult to predict. He would be under pressure, probably including some from Moscow, to modify his behavior until the threat passed. But his natural inclination would be to show defiance in order to test US will and to bring domestic US and international (including Soviet) pressures to bear in Havana's favor.

84. In sum, we judge that under most circumstances—certainly anything much short of fear of impending US military action that threatened his regime's survival—Castro will probably continue his support of regional revolutionaries. In his logic, militancy and defiance will be seen as the best course for keeping the United States at bay and for creating sufficient revolutionary siblings in the region to insulate him over time from US pressures. The issue of US military threats aside, only a combination of decisive setbacks to the revolutionaries he supports, increased Cuban isolation in the region, greater strains at home, and Soviet pressures would be likely to induce a substantial change in Castro's regional game plan anytime soon.

B. Castro's Extreme Option

85. We estimate that there is a small chance (about 20 percent) that even in the absence of US punitive measures, Castro will become so frustrated by combinations of events and conditions during the next year or so that he would heed the advice of Cuban hardliners and adopt confrontational policies on an even broader scale than indicated by our estimates above. In a sense he would conclude fatalistically that increased hostility with the United States was inevitable and thus discount the international benefits of relative "good behavior." While he still would be wary of a direct military confrontation, he would increase efforts to frustrate and undercut US initiatives throughout the region. There also is some chance that he will impulsively confront the United States, or certain Latin American countries, on a scale large enough to result in serious damage to his interests.

86. A number of factors could be involved in such a change of course. One important one would be the degree to which Castro feels that the gains made by Central American revolutionaries during the last two years are threatened. Other factors would be worsening domestic problems or serious disagreement with Moscow over, for instance, the extent to which both countries should support the Sandinistas if US policy toward them becomes more hostile. In this scenario, Castro would, out of frustration and anger, reject the option of retrenchment in the face of setbacks and seek to recoup instead through greater aggressiveness.

87. Under such a course, Castro would be willing, even more blatantly and recklessly than he is now, to

14

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

help Latin American leftists organize and launch guerrilla campaigns, to provide training and other support, and to dispatch Cuban advisers to target countries. A larger number of countries, perhaps including Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, and Venezuela, would then be added to those where Castro already actively supports armed revolutionary struggle and broad "anti-imperialist" fronts. In effect, he would be reverting to the policies of the 1960s, when Cuba was dedicated to promoting revolutionary change even in countries where "objective conditions" were unfavorable.

88. Purely vengeful actions against rival regime leaders would also be more likely, as would resort to terrorist techniques—assassinations, bombings, and other violence—aimed at embarrassing and destabilizing adversary governments. More confrontational policies aimed at placing the United States on the defensive in bilateral relations would also be more likely. Another sudden exodus of disgruntled Cubans could be initiated either by sea or directly into Guantanamo. Subversive, even violent, activities in Puerto Rico and other types of harassment could also result. If he took such a course Castro would vigorously and publicly seek assurances from Moscow of Soviet strategic support.

C. Cuba and the Region

89. Whatever shifts in bilateral and regional policies Cuba and the United States may adopt over the next few years, Castro will almost certainly continue to portray Cuba and the United States as rival poles of influence. He will retain the support of vocal and influential groups in the region for his anti-US sentiments, particularly among students and intellectuals as well as nationalists and leftists of varying outlooks. If forces impelling political instability in Central America and parts of the Caribbean strengthen, Cuban prestige and influence will continue to be strong, almost regardless of what Castro does.

90. Castro has impressive assets for exploiting opportunities that advance his interests in the region at the expense of the United States. He benefits from massive Soviet military and economic support. Policy decisions are swiftly carried out by the Cuban leadership, and it has the ability to adjust tactics readily to suit changing circumstances and favorable developments. Castro has formidable diplomatic, propaganda, intelligence, technical assistance, guerrilla training,

and military resources for a small country. Moreover, Havana has established dependable political and clandestine networks throughout the region and will retain influence with leftists and opposition groups even in countries where state-to-state relations are currently poor.

91. Paradoxically, we judge that the more prudent Castro's activities in support of Latin America revolutionaries, the more likely Cuba is to make significant and sustainable gains in influence in the region. The continued weakening of the established order in Central America and the Caribbean—in the face of mounting social and economic problems—and the growing strength of radical forces could produce one or more new revolutionary regimes over the next several years in which Cuban influence will be either dominant or high. By orchestrating broad political and international support for revolutionary movements, as in Nicaragua in 1979, Cuba risks competition with other countries for influence with the new governments, but it decreases the prospects of successful intervention by the United States or action against Cuban interests by antagonistic Latin American governments. Over time, moreover, nonrevolutionary changes in some governments (for example, Venezuela) could produce improved bilateral relations for Havana as well as greater support for revolutionary movements in the region.

92. In contrast, Cuban adoption of a policy of reckless and indiscriminate support of revolutionaries would tend to isolate both the Castro regime and the revolutionary movements it supports. Vigorous Cuban support for revolutionary groups in South America would especially stimulate movements by key regional countries to curb Castro's influence. Thus, if in this environment pro-Cuban forces were to seize power—in El Salvador, for example, or in one of the Caribbean islands—they might have difficulty in consolidating their regimes in an environment of regional hostility.

93. Even if, in these circumstances, Castro sharply alienated moderate and conservative regional governments, the United States would face difficulty in organizing broad anti-Cuban fronts either in the Organization of American States or through other multilateral forums. Even in the more conservative countries of the region, nationalism and suspicion of US intentions run high. The increasingly complex international

~~SECRET~~

relationships of most Latin American countries and the changing orientations of a new generation of leaders and elites have sharply reduced the US ability to shape events unilaterally. For these and other reasons, we judge that a majority of countries—including nearly all of the most important ones—would oppose any US efforts to organize multilateral actions or sanctions against Cuba, except in the most extraordinary circumstances.

94. This is not to say that governments that adopt anti-Cuban policies would not seek US encouragement and assistance in holding Castro at bay. What they would wish to avoid is direction of anti-Cuban sentiment toward particularistic US objectives, especially reinstatement of "excessive" US influence in the region, efforts to isolate Cuba completely in hemisphere affairs, and frontal attacks against Cuban diplomatic initiatives on issues involving the less developed and the industrial countries.

95. US maneuvering would also be complicated by destabilizing tendencies in Latin America, resulting from mounting social and economic pressures in many nations. Although traditional elites will remain dominant in most of the region, forces for dramatic change will become stronger in several countries in the 1980s. In some, fundamental change may be imposed from the top down by elites employing new methods, in order, in effect, to "steal the thunder" of radical leftist movements.

96. Greater US political, economic, and security involvement in the region can only slowly alleviate the root causes of instability and assuage the pressures for change. But this increased US engagement could work in the interim to reduce Cuban ability to gain further advantage—by helping to address pressures through nonrevolutionary political change, by shoring up beleaguered governments, and by raising the costs and risks of Cuban militancy.

~~SECRET~~

DISSEMINATION NOTICE

1. This document was disseminated by the National Foreign Assessment Center. This copy is for the information and use of the recipient and of persons under his or her jurisdiction on a need-to-know basis. Additional essential dissemination may be authorized by the following officials within their respective departments:

- a. Director of Intelligence and Research, for the Department of State
- b. Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, for the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
- c. Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, for the Department of the Army
- d. Director of Naval Intelligence, for the Department of the Navy
- e. Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, for the Department of the Air Force
- f. Director of Intelligence, for Headquarters, Marine Corps
- g. Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Intelligence Analysis, for the Department of Energy
- h. Assistant Director, FBI, for the Federal Bureau of Investigation
- i. Director of NSA, for the National Security Agency
- j. Special Assistant to the Secretary for National Security, for the Department of the Treasury
- k. The Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment for any other Department or Agency

2. This document may be retained, or destroyed by burning in accordance with applicable security regulations, or returned to the National Foreign Assessment Center.

3. When this document is disseminated overseas, the overseas recipients may retain it for a period not in excess of one year. At the end of this period, the document should be destroyed or returned to the forwarding agency, or permission should be requested of the forwarding agency to retain it in accordance with IAC-D-69/2, 22 June 1953.

4. The title of this document when used separately from the text is unclassified.

~~SECRET~~

This page is intentionally left blank.