Bolívar Analyzes Patriot Failures in Venezuela, 1812

“Memorial to the Citizens of New Granada by a Citizen of Caracas”

[Bolívar's analysis of the causes for the initial failure of the patriot cause in Venezuela. He also seeks Colombia's help in retaking Caracas, the capital of Venezuela; pamphlet published in 1813]

Cartagena [Colombia], December 15, 1812

. . . what weakened the Venezuelan government most was the federal form it adopted in keeping with the exaggerated precepts of the rights of man; this form by authorizing self-government, disrupts social contracts and reduces nations to anarchy. Such was the true state of the Confederation. Each province governed itself in-dependently; and, following this example, each city demanded like powers, based on the practice of the provinces and on the theory that all men and all peoples are entitled to establish arbitrarily the form of government that pleases them.

The federal system, although the most perfect and the most capable of providing for human happiness in society, is, nevertheless, the most contrary to the interests of our infant states. Generally speaking, our fellow-citizens are not yet able to exercise their rights themselves in the fullest measure, because they lack the political virtues that characterize true republicans—virtues that are not acquired under absolute governments, where the rights and duties of the citizen are not recognized.

Moreover, what country in the world, however well trained and republican it may be, can, amidst internal factions and foreign war, be governed by so complicated and weak a system as the federal? No, this system cannot possibly be maintained during the turbulence of battles and political factions. It is essential that a government mold itself, so to speak, to the nature of the circumstances, the times, and the men that comprise it. If these factors are prosperity and peace, the government should be mild and protecting; but if they are turbulence and disaster, it should be stern and arm itself with a firmness that matches the dangers, without regard for laws or constitutions until happiness and peace have been reestablished.

Caracas was made to suffer severely by the shortcomings of the Confederation, which, far from aiding it, exhausted its treasury and war supplies. When danger threatened, the Confederation abandoned the city to its fate without assisting it with even a small contingent. The Confederation, moreover, created new difficulties, for the rivalry which developed between the federal and the provincial authorities enabled the enemies to penetrate deep into the heart of the State and to occupy a large part of the province before the question as to whether federal or provincial troops should go out to repel them was settled. This fatal debate resulted in a terrible and costly delay to our armies, for they were muted at San Carlos while awaiting the reinforcements needed for victory.

I believe that, unless we centralize our American governments, our enemies will gain every advantage. We will inevitably be involved in the horrors of civil strife and miserably defeated by that handful of bandits who infest our territories.

The popular elections held by the simple people of the country and by the scheming inhabitants of the city added a further obstacle to our practice of federation, because the former are so ignorant that they cast their votes mechanically and the latter so ambitious that they convert everything into factions. As a result, Venezuela never witnessed a free and proper election and the government was placed in the hands of men who were either inept, immoral, or opposed to the cause of independence. Party spirit determined everything and, consequently, caused us more disorganization than the circumstances themselves. Our division, not Spanish arms, returned us to slavery.

The earthquake of March 26, to be sure, was physically and morally destructive and can properly be termed the immediate cause of Venezuela's ruin; but this event could have happened without producing such fatal results had Caracas been governed at that time by a single authority, who, acting promptly and vigorously, could have repaired the damage without those hindrances and rivalries which retarded the effectiveness of the measures taken and allowed the evil to grow to such proportions that it is beyond remedy.

If Caracas had established the simple government that its political and military situation required, instead of a slow-moving and insubstantial confederation, Venezuela would still exist and enjoy its freedom today!

Following the earthquake, ecclesiastical influences played a very considerable part in the insurgency of the villages and smaller towns, and in bringing enemies into the country, thereby sacrilegiously abusing the sanctity of their office in behalf of the fomenters of civil war. We must, nevertheless, honestly confess that these traitorous priests were encouraged to commit the execrable crimes of which they are justly accused because they enjoyed absolute impunity for their crimes—an impunity which found scandalous support in the Congress. This injustice reached such a point that, following the insurrection of the city of Valencia, the pacification of which cost up perhaps a thousand men, not a single rebel was brought to justice; all retained their lives and many their property.

From the above it follows that among the causes that brought about Venezuela's downfall the nature of its Constitution ranks first, which, I repeat, was as contrary to Venezuela's interests as it was favorable to those of her adversaries; second, the spirit of misanthropy which possessed our governing officials; third, the opposition to the establishment of a military force which could save the Republic and repulse the Spanish attacks; fourth, the earthquake, accompanied by a fanaticism that used this occurrence to its best advantage; and, last, the internal factions which in reality were the fatal poison that laid the country in its tomb.

These instances of error and misfortune will not be entirely with-out benefit to the peoples of South America who aspire to achieve liberty and independence.

New Granada has seen Venezuela succumb and should therefore avoid the pitfalls that destroyed the latter. To this end, I submit, as a measure indispensable for the security of New Granada, the re-conquest of Caracas. At first sight this project will appear farfetched, costly, perhaps impracticable; but, examined closely, with foresight and careful reflection, it is as impossible to deny its necessity as to fail to put it into execution once it is proved advisable.