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## AGENDAS, SIDE ISSUES AND LEADERSHIP IN THE US HOUSE

William Hixon and Bryan W. Marshall

### ABSTRACT

We introduce a view of congressional party leaders as strategic manipulators of issue dimensions, similar in spirit to Riker's (1982, 1986) heresthetics. Party leaders have incentives to add to bills content from a secondary dimension in order to attract moderates' support. This strategy can be cheaper than compromising along the liberal-conservative dimension. Empirically, moderates differ in their second-dimension preferences from non-moderates – a necessary condition for the strategy to work as we suggest it might. House passage of a 1997 emergency appropriations bill illustrates this strategy. Our view of party leadership challenges to some extent the argument that legislative parties reduce the dimensionality of congressional decision making and questions the one-dimensional picture of congressional politics.

**KEY WORDS** • Congress • dimensionality • heresthetics • legislative parties • roll-call voting,

### 1. Introduction

One of the most challenging problems facing congressional scholars is the task of measuring and explaining the effects of party in Congress. Efforts to identify party effects have taken two forms. Much of the current literature attempts to isolate party influence on members' roll-call votes. Krehbiel (1993) has set a high standard by arguing that party effects can only be counted once legislator preferences are controlled for, and several scholars have undertaken that challenge (Krehbiel, 1995, 2000; Binder et al., 1999; McCarty et al., 2001; Snyder and Groseclose, 2000, 2001; Cox and Poole, 2002).

A second kind of party influence – influence over the agenda – is widely acknowledged but has yet to be investigated as comprehensively as member decisions have been. This kind of influence comes from party leaders attempting to

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We would like to thank Keith Poole for making NOMINATE data, the W-NOMINATE program publicly available. We are also grateful to the congressional staffers who shared their time and to the reviewers and Editor of this journal for useful suggestions.

structure the choice situation to increase the odds of a win, rather than attempting to influence the behavior of individual members. Much of the research of this sort has focused on the variety of procedural devices that majority leaders can use to advance party priorities, examining the distribution of amendment rules and floor waivers, the use of task forces, and assignments to standing committees and conference committees for evidence of partisan motivations (for example, see Rohde, 1991; Aldrich, 1995; Sinclair, 1995, 1999; Aldrich and Rohde, 1996a, 1996b, 1998a, 1998b; Dion and Huber, 1996; Marshall, 2002).

The goal of this article is to introduce, to suggest as plausible, and to reveal evidence for a previously underappreciated side of legislative leadership.<sup>1</sup> We argue that in addition to twisting arms and exerting agenda control, leaders also attempt to expand the dimensions of legislative choice – creating, informally focusing attention on, or formally incorporating in the agenda otherwise dormant issue dimensions – to try to secure relatively inexpensive wins for party positions.

This view is inspired by Riker's (1986: ix) general conception of political leadership as heresthetics, or 'structuring the world so you can win'.<sup>2</sup> Riker described three kinds of heresthetic maneuvers, two of which have been applied to the activities of legislative leaders, although not identified explicitly as heresthetics: strategic voting (at the heart of party influence over individual member decisions) and agenda control (e.g. through restrictive rules, etc.). This article applies the third, dimensional manipulation, and traces its implications for the ongoing debate about the significance of parties in congressional politics.

The idea that party leaders add dimensions to the legislative agenda runs somewhat counter to several themes in the literature, notably that most congressional voting over time can be summarized by a one-dimensional model (Poole and Rosenthal, 1997) and that parties act as simplifying mechanisms, reducing legislative decisions to basically one dimension (Aldrich, 1995). While these interpretations may be useful for summarizing large numbers of votes over much of congressional history, there is nevertheless room for the strategy we describe to be significant in understanding legislative outcomes. The strategy we describe involves exploiting relatively minor dimensions to attract support from just enough moderates to pass a bill. Because the availability of the strategy and the choice of particular dimensions to exploit could vary from bill to bill, and because it involves attracting support from a relatively small proportion of members located at or near the median on the liberal-conservative dimension, this strategy would not systematically affect something like NOMINATE or other voting

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1. Evans's (2004) recent work represents a major effort to call attention to a particular version of the strategy we describe, arguing that congressional leaders use pork barrel benefits to attract support for general interest legislation.

2. In our view, Riker's theory has been underappreciated not only by legislative scholars, but by political scientists in general. For exceptions, see McLean's (2002) review of applications, extensions and criticisms of Riker's theory.

scores. Techniques like NOMINATE are designed to pick up regularities (i.e. the same secondary dimension being exploited on many bills) and are most sensitive to deviations among extremists. A strong liberal voting with strong conservatives suggests a second dimension is at work more so than two similar moderates switching positions, which would be considered estimation error. But to the extent that leaders perceive the opportunity to exploit variation on minor issues in order to buy the support of the swing voter, it is politically quite significant. In other words, there is room in a nearly one-dimensional Congress where majority leaders' top strategic priority is to maintain the basic liberal-conservative split for leaders to invoke minor issues to pass key bills – an effect of party leadership which is politically, but not statistically, significant.

This article sketches the theory underlying this strategy of dimensional manipulation as a complement to other kinds of party effects. Section 2 describes ongoing efforts to detect meaningful party effects in Congress. Section 3 describes the strategy of dimensional manipulation. Section 4 shows that moderates vary in their positions on secondary issues, a necessary condition for dimensional manipulation of the kind we outline to work. Section 5 illustrates this strategy with evidence from passage of an appropriations bill, and Section 6 discusses the implications of our findings for the literature on party effects and concludes.

## 2. Party Effects in Congress

The literature on congressional parties lists a number of tools and strategies that party leaders can use to try to build coalitions. The variety of party effects can be divided into two classes: directly influencing legislator behavior, and structuring choice situations to attempt to bring about desired outcomes. The difference is that the second kind of strategy does not involve leadership arm twisting or vote buying. It simply captures the leadership's anticipation of – rather than control over – how members respond to possible agendas, and implementation of the particular agenda that leads to the best outcome for the party.

Most of the recent efforts have focused on detecting the first kind of party effect, either by comparing members' votes to their policy preferences in large-scale studies (e.g. Snyder and Groseclose, 2000, 2001) or by comparing member decisions with their preferences in particular case studies (Krehbiel, 1995; Binder et al., 1998). The theory behind these studies is that party leaders can pressure members or instill party loyalty by threatening committee assignments, offering to schedule legislation of concern to the member, and so on.

Although the recent literature has emphasized the first kind of party effect, the second kind of party effect has been explored as well, especially in the case of the US House. Indeed, scholars have paid a great deal of attention to party leaders' efforts to structure agendas to their advantage. Aldrich and Rohde (1996a, 1996b, 1998a, 1998b), and Rhode (1991) review a variety of strategies, including structuring

amendment possibilities, waiving standing rules of the House, packaging omnibus legislation, appropriations riders, and so on. In addition, Dion and Huber (1996) and Marshall (2002) develop explicit theoretical accounts of the Rules Committee as a partisan gatekeeper in one-dimensional models. Aldrich (1995) interprets parties as dimensional simplifiers with leaders using both procedural and rhetorical strategies to reduce the active range of choice to a manageable number of dimensions. The common theme is that the majority party controls the mechanisms by which policy alternatives are mapped onto salient dimensions of choice (Sinclair, 1999).

Our work focuses on how party leaders may employ their powers to alter how underlying issues become active dimensions of choice for a select set of members. Much of the recent thinking on the nature of the choice space in Congress has been shaped by the work of Poole and Rosenthal, collected and summarized in their 1997 book. Our work relates to theirs in two specific ways. First, Poole and Rosenthal (1997) do not explain how specific issues get mapped onto the underlying ideological continuum (or dimension) on which members of Congress base their roll-call decisions. We do not model this phenomenon directly either, but do argue that party leaders play an important role in explaining how potential issues get mapped onto the active choice space. Second, Poole and Rosenthal recognize that one dimension may not be enough to describe all roll-call behavior and that party is a 'constraining influence' that tends to reduce dimensions to a single liberal-conservative one. We do not disagree with these claims as a general summary of aggregate roll-call voting patterns, but our interest is different. We are interested in how party leaders secure wins on specific votes. The method of adding dimensions to attract the pivotal voter's support might not affect the behavior of enough members on enough votes in the same ways to stand out in aggregate vote studies, but in the right situation it can be very attractive to party leaders.

### 3. Party Leadership and Manipulation of Dimensions

This article explores another potential tool that party leaders can use to structure the agenda to their advantage. We develop the idea that majority party leaders in the House can use their powers of scheduling and their positions as focal points to add or manipulate issues or dimensions in bills.<sup>3</sup>

Others have suggested that the majority party attempts to reduce the active dimensionality of policy decisions when it suits them (notably Aldrich, 1995). We do not disagree with this idea, but we argue that a majority leader might also have incentives to add properly chosen issues to a bill, thus increasing the dimensionality of the

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3. As we indicate later, some of the strategies we discuss might be available to minority leaders as well. But most belong exclusively to the majority leadership, so this is our focus.

decision space. The idea behind this strategy is to attract moderate support while trading away as little as possible on the principal dimension of interest to the party. The technique is to find an issue that moderates care about, on which their preferences differ from those of other members but not along the main dimension of partisan conflict, and attract their support on a main dimension proposal that is attractive to the party by adding second-dimension content. Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the strategy. Figure 1 lays out a one-dimensional, three-member legislature.




Figure 1. One-dimensional Model




Figure 2. Two-dimensional Model

Assume Legislator 1 has proposal power, but needs 2’s support to win. The location of the status quo defines the range of proposals that 2 would support, and the best that 1 can do in one dimension is to propose the left-most point in that win set, Point A. But, if 1 can change the game by adding a carefully chosen side issue, one on which 2 has relatively extreme preferences, then 1 can do better than is possible in one dimension. Figure 2 shows that in the two-dimensional

scenario, the set of points 1 prefers to A intersects the set of points 2 prefers to A. By proposing something in this intersection, both 1 and 2 fare better than they would under the one-dimensional compromise.<sup>4</sup>

This strategy could be viewed as an effort to buy the vote of the first-dimension moderate. Vote buying is typically discussed as the offer of some kind of targeted incentive in exchange for a member's vote. Targeted incentives from majority leaders can include certain procedural benefits, such as the right to offer an amendment to some future bill or consideration in committee assignments, while others such as the one we describe here are policy based. The strategy we sketch here is likely to be cheaper than many alternatives. Certainly it is cheaper than compromising with the moderate on the horizontal dimension only. Also, many legislative punishments or rewards require others' collaboration, cooperation or at least tacit consent.<sup>5</sup> Rewards and punishments involving committee assignments cannot be fine tuned to reflect member choices on individual roll-calls, but rather respond to the member's entire record. It is easy to imagine that the strategy of devising and injecting appropriate second-dimension content into a roll-call comparison might in a variety of cases be a cheaper and more selective way of building coalitions than many of the typical arm-twisting strategies.

The issue content of a bill can be changed by a variety of mechanisms. Majority leaders can do this in the committee stage via task forces or negotiation among standing committees, through packaging and/or waiving germaneness in a special rule, or by allowing members to attempt to do this through floor amendments.<sup>6</sup> A subtler possibility is that leaders might reinterpret either the bill or the status quo in a way that adds second-dimension content. Aldrich (1995) provides one historical example and Riker (1986) provides several examples of the interpretive option.

#### **4. Variation among Moderates: Opportunities for Dimensional Manipulation**

This section shows that first-dimension moderates in the House can differ among themselves and from first-dimension extremists along secondary dimensions. While moderates' special position in the center of the first dimension makes them

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4. As drawn here, both 1 and 2 have circular indifference curves, that is, they value both horizontal and vertical issues equally, but have different preferences. Player 1 could do even better if he found a side issue which he does not value as much as the first issue, in effect giving him elliptical indifference curves. In other words, we believe our discussion covers side issues on which first-dimension moderates have outstanding and/or differently shaped preferences.

5. Especially important in the post-reform era, when the party caucuses have reasserted collective control over their leaders (Rhode, 1991).

6. The procedural strategies are available to only majority leaders in the House. But rhetorical strategies are available to both sides, and future work will consider both majority and minority attempts to influence issue selection and interpretation.

targets of coalition builders, we argue that variation in their second dimension positions creates potential opportunities for the kind of coalition building described earlier. Moderates' differences on secondary issues give leaders the opportunity to structure the agenda or to construe bills in ways that win moderate support without trading away as much on the first dimension as would be necessary if that were the only issue.

It is possible to demonstrate this variation in a number of ways. Both W-NOMINATE and interest group scores reveal similar patterns, and we illustrate it here with Americans for Democratic Action scores, one popular measure of legislator placement on the liberal-conservative dimension, from the House in 2001.<sup>7</sup> We limit consideration to moderates, defined as those members who voted with the ADA on 50 or 60 per cent of the 20 votes scored during that session.<sup>8</sup> Table 1 displays patterns of support among these moderates on all 20 votes.

There are five House members who supported the ADA position on 50 per cent of the scored votes, and five others who supported the ADA on 60 per cent of the votes. If each member who voted with the ADA on 10 out of 20 votes had the same underlying preferences – which is how political scientists commonly treat these scores – then we would expect them to have voted the ADA position on the same 10 bills. In other words, if their only motivation were their identical, moderate first-dimension views, they should respond identically to the 20 bills.

But the table clearly shows that the response to each bill is not identical. There is a great deal of variation within the 50 per cent supporters and the 60 per cent supporters. For instance, only two bills, HR 2356 and HR 3090, were supported by all five 50 per cent supporters, and only one was supported by none of the 50 per cent supporters. This leaves 17 of 20 scored bills over which the 50 per cent supporters had different preferences. Four members supported the bills listed in the second row of the table, three supported those in the third row, and so on. Each member supported the group 50 per cent of the time, and would be counted as having identical positions on the left–right spectrum when scores like these are used as a measure of member preferences. But there is variety in the bills on which these members supported the ADA position. The listing for the group of 60 per cent supporters reveals similar variety in patterns of support.

Further, the pattern of support among these moderates is very different than what we would expect randomly. In a simple Euclidean spatial voting model the preferences for each of these moderate legislators would be mapped in the same space along a single liberal-conservative dimension (Enelow and Hinich, 1984). If we

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7. ADA scores are routinely used by congressional scholars as measures of legislators' general left–right positions. There is nothing special about our selection of this group's 2001 scores. Similar illustrations could be made using ADA scores from other years. We believe that other interest group scores would yield similar results, as have our examinations, not reported here, of first- and second-dimension W-NOMINATE scores. As Burden et al. (2000) report, most commonly used measures of legislator ideology are highly correlated.

8. Slightly varying our definition of first-dimension moderates would not affect the demonstration.

Table 1. House Moderates' Support for ADA Positions, 2001

Level of ADA Support	Bills Scored by ADA in 2001		Frequency Member Support
50% support ( <i>n</i> = 5)	HR2356 Campaign Finance	HR3090 Economic Stimulus	5
	HR8 Estate Tax	HR1 School Vouchers	
	HR6 Marriage Tax	HR2563 Patients' Rights/HMO	4
	HR1836 Tax Cut	HR2975 Anti-terrorism	
	SJRes6 Ergonomics	HR4 ANWR Drill Ban	3
		HJRes50 China Trade	2
		HR7 Faith-Based In.	HR3000 Fast Track
		HR3 Income Tax Red.	HR2944 Domestic Partner
		HR503 Fetal Protection	HR2586 Military Abortions
	HR333 Bankruptcy Overhaul		1
			0

**Table 1.** (Continued)

Level of ADA Support	Bills Scored by ADA in 2001				Frequency Member Support	
60% Support ( <i>n</i> = 5)	HR8 Estate Tax	HR2356 Campaign Finance	HR 2563 Patients' Rights/HMO	HR2563 Patients' Rights	HR3090 Economic Stimulus	5
	HR6 Marriage Tax	HR1 School Vouchers	HR3000 Fast Track			4
	HR3 Income Tax Red.	HR7 Faith-Based In.	HR2586 Military Abortions			3
	HR1836 Tax Cut	HR4 ANWR Drill Ban				2
	HR333 Bankruptcy Overhaul	SJRes6 Ergonomics	HJRes36 Flag Desecration	HJRes50 China Trade	HR2944 Domestic Partner	1
	HR503 Fetal Protection					0

assume that the 20 bills scored by ADA were randomly distributed across this same dimension, then the probability of a particular legislator supporting a bill would be 0.5.<sup>9</sup> Given these assumptions, the probability of the observed pattern of support on these bills is very small: 0.0013. This suggests that either the bills are not randomly distributed or that the one-dimensional voting model is not supported by these data. We think the former is not likely the case because similar results can be obtained from other years' scores. Thus, this empirical pattern is likely the result of the fact that there are multiple dimensions affecting each legislator's voting decision.

One other indicator of the extent to which moderates differ from extremists in ways other than along the principal dimension of rating is revealed by the order of bills. We ranked the bills by the extent to which the entire House supported the ADA position and compared that with a ranking based on the extent to which these moderates (50 per cent and 60 per cent combined) supported the ADA position. If only the first dimension mattered, we would expect the rankings to be similar. But in fact the correlation between these rankings is near zero (0.069 Spearman rank order correlation). The implication is that moderates are motivated by different aspects of the bills than those on which members with relatively extreme preferences separate.

## 5. A Case Study of Party Leadership and Secondary Issues

The House passage in 1997 of an emergency supplemental appropriations bill illustrates well party leaders' attention to secondary issues in coalition building.<sup>10</sup> Efforts to pass this bill stalled when a group of Republicans voted with Democrats against the special rule that would have brought the bill to the floor for a vote. In the wake of this defeat, Republican leaders used all of the strategies discussed in this article to pull together a winning coalition and pass a second proposed rule. Simple whipping seemed to be enough to win over some conservatives, whose opposition to the first rule can be understood in liberal-conservative terms. Of greater theoretical interest, though, was the Republican leadership's effort to attract additional support by altering some of the secondary provisions in the rule and bill, provisions that were not reducible to the liberal-conservative dimension. This section presents qualitative and quantitative evidence that some members who opposed the first rule but supported the second did so because of revised minor-dimension content in the second rule.

The main purpose of the bill (HR 1469) was to direct emergency disaster relief money to flood victims in the Midwest. Initially, Republican leaders planned to use

9. This assumes that the bills are randomly distributed according to a binomial distribution,  $Pr(\text{support for a bill}) = n!/r!(n-r)! * \pi^r(1-\pi)^{n-r}$  where  $n$  is the number of trials,  $r$  the number of successes, and  $\pi$  is the probability of success.

10. Our retelling of this story is based on Taylor (1997a, 1997b).

the bill as a vehicle for several controversial amendments, including amendments relating to Bosnia, aid to former Soviet republics, and a continuing resolution that would have funded federal programs for 1998 at 100 per cent of the 1997 levels in the event that Congress failed to set those levels through regular appropriations bills. One side issue that became relevant in the debate over the bill was a provision in the bill that would have broadened competition for the contract to supply currency-quality paper to the US Treasury.

The focus of the conflict in this case was not the bill itself, but the resolution that would have brought the bill to the floor. Among other things, the rule would determine whether the currency paper proposal would be allowed to remain in the bill. The standing rules of the House prohibit inclusion of legislative language, such as the paper proposal, in appropriations bills. So the provision could have been challenged on the floor unless the special rule protected it by waiving the relevant standing rule.

The first rule offered by the Rules Committee (HR 146) made several amendments in order but did not contain a waiver protecting the currency paper provision. The House defeated the rule by a vote of 193–229, with 43 Republicans defecting to vote against it. The Rules Committee responded with a new rule (HR 149) which passed, 269–152. The second rule dropped the amendments on Bosnia and on aid to the former Soviet republics, kept the continuing resolution, and added the waiver necessary to protect the paper currency provision.

We can see the strategy of manipulating secondary-dimension content clearly at work here. While some of the dynamics between these two votes can be explained simply in liberal-conservative terms, there is evidence as well that one issue not reducible to the left–right dimension, in particular the currency paper issue, accounted for some of the votes gained by Republicans on their second attempt to pass a rule.<sup>11</sup>

The journalistic account of this episode lists several reasons for the vote switching that passed the second rule. Nearly half of the 43 Republican opponents of the first rule are thought to have opposed it on ideological grounds. For them, the bill contained too much new spending and they would have favored something lower than the 100 per cent funding level set in the continuing resolution. Their support for the second rule was won not by compromises in the rule, which did nothing to address their complaints with the first one, but by simple leadership arm twisting. In addition, a handful of members who had objected to the Bosnia and Soviet aid amendments in the first rule supported the second rule, which dropped those amendments. So part of the action can be explained in terms of the main, liberal-conservative dimension and in terms of the familiar leadership tactic of arm twisting.<sup>12</sup>

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11. The dynamic was one-sided. The Republican side gained 83 votes from the first vote to the second and lost only seven.

12. It is easy to imagine that the response to the dropped amendments does not neatly fit a one-dimensional model. This would of course further support our argument that coalition building can involve secondary dimensions.

To demonstrate leadership uses of second-dimension content we focus on another issue – the currency paper proposal – and on another group of vote switchers whose behavior cannot be explained in simple ideological terms. One of the key players on this issue was Michael Pappas, a first-term Republican from New Jersey. Pappas's district was home to a firm that was prevented from bidding for the Treasury's currency paper business because of a requirement that firms supplying the Treasury be at least 90 per cent American-owned. HR 1469 contained a provision that would have lowered this threshold and allowed the New Jersey factory to compete for the Treasury contract. Pappas had been assured by some Republican leaders that the rule for the bill would contain a waiver protecting this item from the House rule prohibiting legislative language in appropriations bills. But because the 90 per cent threshold favored a paper firm operating in and around the district of Rules Committee chairman, Gerald Solomon, the Rules Committee did not furnish the waiver. Pappas convinced fellow members of the Government Reform Committee to join with him against the rule. In order to win support for the second rule from Pappas and those who followed him on the first, the Rules Committee added the waiver.

Pappas and his allies did not react to the absence of the waiver out of ideological leanings, but rather out of constituency interests (for Pappas at least) and a desire to stand up for their fellow committee member over the perception of a broken commitment (evidently the motive for Pappas's allies). The point is that winning the support of this group turned on the kind of cheap addition of second-dimension content presented in this article. Without the waiver, the bill would not address the paper supply issue. By including a waiver, the issue could be raised in the bill. In addition, the only evident opposition to the waiver can be explained by constituency rather than ideological interests. While the waiver may have upset Solomon and a handful of others, some of whose constituents would now face a little more competition in bidding for the Treasury contract, it was far less costly to Republicans overall, a great many of whom would have been upset by compromise on the liberal-conservative dimension.

Further evidence of the multidimensional nature of coalition building in this case is revealed by a statistical analysis of voting behavior on the two rules. The first point to establish is that voting on the rules was, overall, basically ideological or partisan. The results of a logistic regression of members' votes on the rule that passed (HR 149) on several possible causal variables shows that a member's placement on the liberal-conservative dimension is the chief predictor of voting on that rule. Table 2 displays these results, and similar ones were obtained for votes on the rule that failed (HR 146).<sup>13</sup>

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13. In explaining votes on HR 146, the party variable carried the most weight, though first- (and second-) dimension NOMINATE scores were significant when party is excluded from the model. The point remains that ideology or party, which is highly correlated with it, is significant in explaining these votes.

**Table 2.** Logit Model of the Rule Vote (HR 149) for the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Bill, 105th Congress

Independent Variables	Logit Estimates $\theta$ /s.e.
Dimension 1 NOMINATE	4.664** (.896)
Dimension 2 NOMINATE	.396 (.365)
Government Reform Committee	.263 (.546)
Party	.006 (.007)
Constant	.123 (1.058)
	LL = -136.126
	$\chi^2 = 267.57$
	$p = .0000$
	$N = 414$

Note. Dependent variable is the vote on the special rule, HR 149 (Roll-call # 130). Standard errors in parentheses are robust. \* and \*\* indicate  $p < .05$  and  $p < .01$  respectively.

But while voting on these two rules can be described as one-dimensional, ideological behavior, the recruitment of pivotal votes that allowed the second rule to pass cannot. To analyze recruitment, we construct the dependent variable Republican convert, which takes the value 1 for members who opposed the first rule but voted for the second rule. Members whose votes did not change, and the few who switched from yes to no, are coded as 0.<sup>14</sup> We use a logit model to estimate the effects of various factors on member conversion to the Republican position. As above, the independent variables include members' positions on the first- and second-dimension DW-NOMINATE<sup>15</sup> scores and a variable indicating membership on the Government Reform committee. This variable should capture a member's response to the paper supply issue. We expect that members of this committee are more likely than non-members to have shared Pappas's reaction to the addition of the waiver he sought to the second rule. As the results in Table 3 indicate, secondary issues played a significant role in Republican efforts to build a majority on the second rule.

14. Once members with insufficient data are dropped, the total sample size is 416, including 83 members who opposed the first rule but supported the second and only four members who supported the first rule but opposed the second.

15. The results do not differ if we use W-NOMINATE instead of DW-NOMINATE scores.

**Table 3.** Logit Model of Vote Switchers, Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Bill, 105th Congress

Independent Variables	Logit Estimates $\theta$ /s.e.
Dimension 1 NOMINATE	.122 (.274)
Dimension 2 NOMINATE	1.307** (.310)
Government Reform Committee	.983** (.381)
Constant	-1.587** (.149)
	LL = -191.954
	$\chi^2 = 19.06$
	$p = .0003$
	$N = 416$

Note. Dependent variable is vote switcher from nay to yea on the special rules votes HR 146 and HR 149. Standard errors in parentheses are robust. \* and \*\* indicate  $p < .05$  and  $p < .01$  respectively.

Membership on the Government Reform committee is a significant predictor of vote switching, demonstrating the coalitional value of compromising with Pappas and his supporters on the secondary issue of the Treasury paper contract. In addition, second-dimension DW-NOMINATE scores help explain vote switching. This shows the importance of other secondary issues in building the coalition to support the second rule. There is no standard interpretation of this second dimension<sup>16</sup> but given the particulars of this story, it might be taken here as embodying members' reactions to the two foreign policy amendments that were deleted in the second rule. Regardless of the particular issues represented by the second dimension, the finding supports our claim that issues other than the main liberal-conservative dimension were central to Republican efforts to recruit supporters for this rule.<sup>17</sup> In other words, leadership action other than arm twisting and compromising on first-dimension issues was decisive in affecting member behavior on these votes.

16. Poole and Rosenthal (1997) argue that until the early 1970s it was best understood as capturing civil rights issues. But since the salience of that division has declined, the issue content of the second dimension is not so easily summarized.

17. Alternative models were estimated to check the robustness of these findings. A model including party as an additional control reveals similar effects of second-dimension preferences and Government Reform membership on vote switching. First-dimension preferences are also significant in this model. Another model, estimated for only the subset of members who voted against the first rule, yields similar results. First-dimension and second-dimension preferences are significant, as is Government Reform membership, although at a lower level than in the model reported here ( $p < 0.108$ ).

## 6. Implications and Conclusion

This article presents a view of House leaders as dimensional manipulators and discusses the incentives and opportunities for leaders to add or to alter the secondary issue content in a bill to attract support for the party's position. We show that this strategy should be attractive to leaders because it allows them to attract potentially crucial votes without compromising the party's position on the primary, liberal-conservative dimension. The fact that ideological moderates vary in their positions on secondary dimensions means that there exist opportunities to attract moderates with concessions on those dimensions. Our case study of the 1997 emergency supplemental appropriations bill provides an illustration of this strategy in action.

These results in some ways complement recent work by Evans (2004). Evans hypothesizes and finds evidence from several cases that congressional leaders use pork as a selective benefit to overcome collective-action problems inherent in passing broad legislation. Much of her evidence could be seen as consistent with our account as well, but our arguments and the implications we draw from them differ somewhat. First, while the amount of pork going to a particular district represents one kind of secondary issue of the sort discussed in this article, it is not the only kind of secondary issue that coalition builders could exploit. Any issue that does not correlate perfectly with the liberal-conservative dimension would be a candidate. Second, we highlight specific implications for the debate over party effects in Congress as well as for the debate between those who argue that Congress is one-dimensional and Riker's ideas about the ever present possibility for heresthetics (McLean, 2002). In particular, recognizing that party leaders add dimensions to congressional politics suggests a meaningful party effect that operates between the broad effect of parties as dimension reducers (as in Aldrich's 1995 account) and the Poole and Rosenthal (1997) empirical conclusion that congressional voting is basically one-dimensional.

It is this implication that we wish to highlight. Analyses of roll-call voting in the US Congress emphasize the primacy of the liberal-conservative dimension, concluding that most voting choices can be explained in terms of members' preferences along this dimension. While we do not disagree with the assertion that a one-dimensional model describes most choices on most bills, we do disagree with the implication that secondary issues and other motivations are not theoretically or politically important. If the goal is to document and explain coalition builders' efforts to attract moderates' support, then one must pay attention to agenda development and manipulation on secondary dimensions.

The difference is one of interpretation. The typical approach to roll-call voting, such as that taken by Poole and Rosenthal (1997), views secondary dimensions that affect only a handful of first-dimension moderates as empirically minor. Votes motivated by side issues, those which do not fit with a one-dimensional model, are considered errors, and do not appreciably reduce statistical support for

a one-dimensional model. This is sensible, of course: it would be a far more serious error to mistake ideologically someone like Ted Kennedy for someone like Jesse Helms than it would be to confuse two very similar moderates. Errors in the middle of the spectrum are relatively tolerable.

But from the point of view of a party leader, adding the right kind of minor issue to a bill – one that wins the support of a pivotal number of moderates without upsetting the base by trading away major party goals – can mean the difference between victory and defeat. If the votes attracted as a result of this manipulation swing the outcome on a piece of legislation, then that manipulation should be identified as a politically meaningful party effect, even if the particular issue exploited varies from bill to bill and even if individual member behavior is not dramatic enough to indicate a statistically significant second dimension in large-sample summaries of voting behavior. In other words, there are significant strategic consequences, if not statistical ones, for not fully appreciating the motivations, however idiosyncratic, of ideological moderates. Keeping liberals straight from conservatives is important, but losing track of a moderate like Jim Jeffords can hurt.

In short, even a statistically nearly one-dimensional Congress leaves room for politically meaningful dimensional manipulation. The party leader as heresthetician remains possible even in a highly polarized Congress.

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